Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an International Antitrust Case: Personal Jurisdiction and Venue by Capra, Daniel J.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 9, Issue 3 1985 Article 1
Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an
International Antitrust Case: Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue
Daniel J. Capra∗
∗
Copyright c©1985 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an
International Antitrust Case: Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue
Daniel J. Capra
Abstract
Finding an appropriate U.S. forum for an international antitrust case is unnecessarily compli-
cated. Congress, with its intent to effectuate broad enforcement of the antitrust laws, has provided
statutory authority, which allows suit in any judicial district so long as the antitrust defendant has
minimum contacts with the United States. Thus far the courts have generally ignored the solution
provided by Congress in favor of the long-arm statutes of the state legislature. This state of affairs
must be corrected in order to prohibit a jurisdictional windfall to alien defendants that was not
intended by Congress.
SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE FEDERAL
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs who seek to bring international antitrust claims
in the United States courts face several important limitations
once it has been established that the United States antitrust
laws can be properly applied.' In order to adjudicate the case
in his or her choice of forum, the plaintiff must clear jurisdic-
tional, procedural, venue, and convenience obstacles.
The plaintiff must first show that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Personal jurisdiction refers to
the power of the court to adjudicate the particular defendant's
rights and obligations. 2 This power must come from the legis-
lature,3 and the legislative grant is subject to constitutional
limitations which seek to prevent the defendant from being
sued in a jurisdiction in which he has no meaningful contacts.4
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D. 1977,
University of California, Berkeley; A.B. 1974, Rockhurst College. My thanks to
Robin Ann Roth for her assistance on this article. The article was made possible by a
research grant from Fordham Law School. For further discussion of this topic, see 1
B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COM-
PARATIVE GUIDE (3d ed. 1986).
1. On this issue of application of antitrust laws see, e.g., United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am. (ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States antitrust law based on intended and actual effects on United
States commerce); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n,
549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (decision to apply United States antitrust law based
on effects and "jurisdictional rule of reason" which takes into account the extent of
the effect on United States commerce and principles of international comity). After
remand, the Ninth Circuit held that its "jurisdictional rule of reason" required dis-
missal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Doctrine of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500
(1981); Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 199 (1977).
2. See Capra, Book Review, Conceptual Limitations on Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 1034, 1042 (1984).
3. See Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 287 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
4. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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The plaintiff must establish a basis upon which the court can
justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
The plaintiff must then show that the defendant has been
properly served with process, i.e., that notice of the action and
a copy of the complaint have been served on the defendant.
Authorization for service of process comes from the legislature
as well,5 subject to constitutional limitations which guarantee
that defendant receives reasonable notice under the circum-
stances, as well as a reasonable opportunity to appear to de-
fend his interests. 6
It must also be shown that venue is proper.7 Venue is
purely a statutory question.' The venue statutes seek to place
an action in a convenient United States forum. 9
Finally, the forum chosen by plaintiff must not seriously
inconvenience the parties or witnesses, or be contrary to the
interests of justice, even though the requirements of personal
jurisdiction and venue have been met.' 0 Venue statutes are
not perfect guarantors of a convenient forum." Consequently,
Congress has provided for transfer of venue, under certain
conditions, throughout the federal system.' 2
Unfortunately, in international antitrust cases, the above
limitations are not as easily distinguishable as should be ex-
pected. One major problem is that while jurisdiction may be
constitutionally obtainable over non-resident defendants, the
legislature must effectuate this possibility by authorizing extra-
5. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4; Clayton Antitrust Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1975).
6. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7. See infra notes 287-374 and accompanying text.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1975); Ehrenzweig, From State
Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 OREGON L. REV. 103 (1971).
9. See LeRoy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979);Johnson Cre-
ative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984) (venue require-
ments are not analogous to personal jurisdiction requirements since venue is con-
cerned with inconvenience while jurisdiction is concerned with whether defendant
has a meaningful relationship with the relevant forum).
10. See infra notes 375-90 and accompanying text.
11. For instance, an alien can be sued in any district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d)
(1982). It cannot be maintained that each judicial district is an equally convenient
place to hear an antitrust case.
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406, 1631 (1982). If the case cannot be conve-
niently tried anywhere in the United States, the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens would arguably be relevant. However, the application of this doctrine. to
antitrust cases has been generally rejected. See infra notes 391-408 and accompany-
ing text.
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territorial service of process. To the extent that the legislature
has not acted, concepts of jurisdiction and service of process
become entangled: jurisdiction is limited only because service
of process is limited in such a case by Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 4).13 Second, the special anti-
trust statute respecting appropriate federal forums-section 12
of the Clayton Act' 4 -speaks to jurisdiction, venue, and service
of process. Courts often try to construe section 12 as a whole,
which is significantly different from the sum of its parts.
In light of the existing confusion surrounding the con-
struction of section 12, Rule 4, and the constitutional limita-
tions on personal jurisdiction, it is time to suggest a simple
solution to the problem of forum allocation in international
antitrust actions. The solution is particularly simple with re-
spect to alien corporate defendants, and follows a logical pro-
gression.
First, section 12 of the Clayton Act should be read to au-
thorize worldwide service of process, thus extending extrater-
ritorial authority over alien defendants to the limits of the due
process clause.' 5 The proper manner of service, as opposed to
the jurisdictional reach of service, is properly governed by
Rule 4.
Second, the only limitation on the legislative grant of
worldwide jurisdiction under section 12 is the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.' 6 The fifth amendment merely
requires that the defendant have minimum contacts with the
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express
Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1973), provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corpora-
tion may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabit-
ant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business;
and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
15. Courts have disputed this proposition on two grounds: 1) section 12 pro-
vides nationwide, but not worldwide service of process; and 2) the venue require-
ments of section 12 must be satisfied before the plaintiff can resort to the service
provisions of section 12. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
16. This proposition is accepted by most courts. See Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d Cir. 1972); supra notes 200-14
and accompanying text. However, some courts either ignore or reject the proposi-
tion that section 12 provides the necessary statutory authority for asserting extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction to the limits of fifth amendment due process. See, e.g., Max
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United States, not with any particular state.' 7 Consequently, if
the alien corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits
and protections of the laws of any part of the United States, it
can be sued in any United States forum.
Third, venue as to aliens is proper in any federal district
court.' 8 Finally, given the broad choice of fora presented by
the above scenario, alien corporations would undoubtedly
claim that they could be subject to extreme burdens of distant
litigation in outrageously chosen fora.' 9 However, these con-
cerns do not present problems ofjurisdiction or constitutional
due process. Rather, these are simply questions of venue.2" If
defendant can show that the plaintiff's choice of forum is sub-
stantially inconvenient, the court can transfer to a more conve-
nient federal district court.2 '
Unfortunately, few courts have taken the simple route out-
lined above.22 Most cases take the antitrust plaintiff through a
procedural thicket of "transacting business" under section 12
of the Clayton Act, and, of all things, state long-arm statutes
and fourteenth amendment constitutional limitations on state
courts. 23 What follows is a discussion of the procedural hur-
Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 383 (1985);
Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418-20 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
17. SeeJohnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir.
1984); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); Cryomedics Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1982). Many courts do not reach the point of invoking
section 1391 (d), because they hold that the statutory service provisions of section 12
of the Clayton Act cannot be invoked without first satisfying statutory venue require-
ments.
19. See Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Fed-
eral Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing suit in Alaska even though defend-
ant's contacts are with Florida).
20. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1981).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc.,
II, 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
22. The important case of General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp.
1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), follows the four step approach to forum allocation discussed
in the text. While an alien corporate defendant can be easily dealt with, the problems
are more complex as to alien individuals because section 12 service does not apply to
them, and as to United States citizens, because 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) does not apply to
them. See infra notes 34 and 289 and accompanying text (discussion of the more
difficult problems of forum allocation).
23. See Dejames, 654 F.2d at 284.
[W]e believe that Hitachi's amenability to suit ... must be judged by four-
teenth amendment standards. We recognize that this creates an anomalous
situation because it results in a federal court in a nondiversity case being
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dles to choosing a forum in an international antitrust case.
With respect to the paradigmatic corporate alien defendant, a
much simpler and more logical solution is possible and has
been used by some courts.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Statutory Authority
1. Rule 4 and the Long-Arm Statutes
It is well settled that a court cannot act to adjudicate the
rights and obligations of a defendant unless it has been given
the authority to do so by the legislature. 24  Rule 4(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally provides that in the
absence of a special federal statute, the statutory power to
reach defendants who must be served outside a particular state
shall extend only to those defendants who could be reached
under the statutes passed by the state legislature of the state in
which the federal court sits. 25 These state statutes are referred
limited by the due process restrictions imposed on the states by the four-
teenth amendment as opposed to those imposed on the federal government
by the fifth amendment.
Id.; see also Lilly,Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 132-40
(1983).
24. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1977). "Not only must the requirements of due process be met before a court can
properly assert in personam jurisdiction, but the exercise ofjurisdiction must also be
affirmatively authorized by the legislature." Id. at 416.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever
a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for
service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district
court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the man-
ner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein
prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. When-
ever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held
provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu
of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or
(2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an
action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his
property located within the state, service may in either case be made under
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
See Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982). Rule 4(f) limits
process under Rule 4 (with certain exceptions not pertinent hereto) to the state in
which the district court sits. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
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to as long-arm statutes. 26 Long-arm statutes differ in both ter-
minology and construction. Some reach the full extent of due
process either explicitly or by judicial construction.27 Other
long-arm statutes exclude certain activities or conduct which
could constitutionally be reached under the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause.28 Many list enumerated acts which
must have occurred in the state in order for jurisdiction to be
statutorily authorized. 29  Accordingly, if service of process
must be made outside the state, and no special federal statute
for service can be found, reference must be made to the vari-
ous long-arm provisions to determine the extent of statutory
power the court-even a federal court in an antitrust case-will
have.30 This may result in inconsistent and incomplete en-
forcement of the antitrust laws; the federal antitrust case will
be controlled by state limitations on their own process."
A plaintiff in an international antitrust action can avoid re-
sort to state long-arm statutes in at least two ways. First, if a
defendant can be served within the state in which the district
court sits---either personally if an individual defendant, or
upon a proper agent if a business entity-then Rule 4(d) pro-
vides a wholly federal means of service, and Rule 4(f) specifi-
cally provides a statutory basis of personal jurisdiction upon
such in-state service.3 2 The only further limitation on such ser-
26. See generally R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 4.01-4.03 (1983).
27. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5322 (Purdon 1981); 2A R.I. GEN. LAws, § 9-5-33 (1969); see also Note, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Antitrust Actions: Toward a More Uniform Ap-
proach, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 330, 333-37 (1980).
28. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1986); Banco
Ambrosiano S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71-73, 464 N.E.2d 432,
434-36, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 66-68 (1984) (quasi in rem jurisdiction fills the gap between
long-arm statute and due process limitations). The anomaly of federal incorporation
of state statutory jurisdiction is especially pronounced when the federal court in a
federal question case cannot enforce federal law because of a limited long-arm stat-
ute which was passed to effectuate state policy. See Lilly, supra note 23, at 136.
29. See, e.g., 32 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.705 (West 1981); 29 Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 506.500 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
30. For a detailed analysis of state long-arm statutes, see R. CASAD, supra note
26, at 4.01-4.09.
31. Compare I.S.Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Co., 408 F. Supp. 1023
(D. Minn. 1976) (state long-arm statute does not reach defendant's antitrust activity)
with Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659
(D.N.H. 1977) (same activity by related defendant can be reached under New Hamp-
shire long-arm).
32. In other words, when service is made by wholly federal means within the
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vice will be the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 33
2. Section 12 of the Clayton Act
The second and more important possibility for avoiding
the vagaries and limitations of the state long-arm statutes is to
invoke the statutory grant of jurisdiction contained in section
12 of the Clayton Act. When service of process is authorized
under section 12, it is clear that the limitations contained in
Rule 4(e) are not applicable. Rule 4 merely governs the man-
ner of service, and not the extent ofjurisdiction, where section
12 is applicable.34 However, the scope of the statutory grant of
personal jurisdiction under section 12 is subject to several
qualifications and to some dispute.
Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for venue, personal
jurisdiction, and service of process as follows:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judi-
cial district whereof it is an inhabitant but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all pro-
cess in such cases may be served in the district of which it is
an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
The first limitation on section 12 as a jurisdictional au-
thorization to serve process outside the state in which the dis-
trict court sits is that the process provision, as well as the venue
state, Rule 4 itself provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, and plaintiff
need not resort to the provisions of Rule 4 which incorporate the jurisdictional limi-
tations of the state long-arm statute. FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see Lone Star Package Car Co.
v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (federal court not bound by
limitations on state courts where in-state service is made under Rule 4(d)); Note,
supra note 27, at 350 n.87; see also Delta Steamships Lines, Inc. v. Albano, 768 F.2d
728 (5th Cir. 1985) (mailed in-state service under Federal Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) estab-
lishes federal statutory basis of jurisdiction).
33. See infra notes 200-14 and accompanying text. If service is made within the
state, it can be made pursuant to state service of process provisions, and yet state
limitations on personal jurisdiction (as distinct from manner of service) will not be
relevant. This is because Rule 4 provides a statutory basis for jurisdiction upon in-
state service, but allows plaintiff to adopt a manner of service authorized by state law.
See Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1981)(in-state service
made pursuant to Louisiana service provision, but state limitations on jurisdictional
power of Louisiana state courts irrelevant in federal action), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928
(1982).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e); see supra note 25; see also Burstein v. State Bar of Cal.,
693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982); F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256-57
(5th Cir. 1981).
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provision, is by its terms only applicable to corporate defend-
ants. Thus, a plaintiff suing an individual defendant in an anti-
trust action has only two possibilities for statutory authoriza-
tion of personal jurisdiction: pursuant to in-state service
under Rule 4, or pursuant to such limited and varied extrater-
ritorial service as is authorized by the relevant state long-arm
statute.
A second possible qualification on section 12 as a grant of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is in dispute among the courts.
Section 12 speaks both to venue and jurisdiction. Some courts
have held that section 12 must be read as a whole; these courts
state that the use of the extraterritorial service provision of
section 12 is predicated upon satisfying the standards of venue
under section 12.35 These courts apparently reason that the
term "process in such cases" contained in the second clause of
section 12 refers to cases in which the venue clause applies,
i.e., those which "may be brought not only in the judicial dis-
trict whereof [defendant] is an inhabitant, but also in any dis-
trict wherein it may be found or transacts business. 36 In some
cases, however, a plaintiff may wish to use the extraterritorial
service provisions of section 12, but will not be able to satisfy
the section 12 venue requirements. However, such a plaintiff
may be able to satisfy another statutory basis of venue. This is
particularly true when the suit is against a corporate alien de-
fendant as to whom venue is proper in any judicial district
under section 1391(d) of title 28 of the United States Code
(section 1391(d)). 3 8 As to such cases, the courts limiting sec-
35. See, e.g., Athlete's Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp.
35,45 (D. Del. 1977); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975)
(dictum), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veter-
inary Medical Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders
Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit refused to decide whether the
section 12 service provisions could be used without satisfying the section 12 venue
provisions.
36. See, e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581 n.7 (2d Cir. 1961),
rev'd on othergrounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
37. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
38. The venue provisions of section 12 of the Clayton Act are supplemented by
the general venue provisions applicable to all federal actions. See Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972); Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384
U.S. 202 (1966); Ballard v. Blue Shield of S. W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir.
1976); infra notes 288-305 and accompanying text.
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tion 12 extraterritorial service to cases in which section 12
venue requirements are satisfied have effectively obliterated
the broad, alternative venue provision of section 1391(d). 9
Other courts have taken the opposing view and have held
that a plaintiff can resort to the extraterritorial provisions of
section 12 without first satisfying the section 12 venue require-
ments. These courts reason that the term "process in such
cases" refers to the cases described in the first clause of section
12, i.e., "any suit, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation," and not to the judicial districts where
venue would be proper.4" Not only is this a more reasonable
construction in terms of a fair reading of the statute, but it is
also a construction which does not deprive section 1391(d) of
all practical value. Moreover, allowing plaintiffs to use the ex-
traterritorial service provisions of section 12 together with the
alien venue provisions of section 1391(d) is a simple, stream-
lined approach: it avoids the difficulties and uncertainties of
establishing state long-arm jurisdiction on the one hand,4' and
the difficulties and uncertainties of establishing a "transacting
business" basis of venue on the other.42 Any concern about
protecting alien defendants from overreaching and substantial
inconvenience is answered by the protections afforded by the
due process clause,4 3 and more importantly by the transfer of
venue provisions. It would thus seem unnecessary to limit
the plain meaning of section 12 in order to provide any further
39. This result is contrary to the rationale of the Supreme Court in Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706 (1972), where the Court states
that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (d) derives from a tradition going "back to the beginning of the
republic... [that] suits against aliens were left unrestricted, and could be tried in any
district, subject only to the requirements of service of process." 406 U.S. at 708 (em-
phasis added).
40. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,594
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court in Bucyrus-Erie distinguished the Second Circuit's con-
trary ruling in Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962), as a case against a United States defendant where venue
could not have been obtained under the general venue statutes, especially not 28
U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1982). See Bucyrus-Erie, 550 F. Supp. at 1040-43. Accordingly, Gol-
dlawr is properly characterized as dictum as to the use of the section 12 service of
process provision where venue can in fact be obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
41. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 300-63 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 204-14 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 375-408 and accompanying text.
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statutory protection to an alien defendant.45
In sum, the better view is that the extraterritorial service
provision of section 12 is independent from the venue provi-
sions. If a contrary view is taken, a plaintiff who cannot satisfy
the venue provisions of section 12 must rely upon the extrater-
ritorial service provisions of the relevant state long-arm statute
for a statutory grant of jurisdiction, or else must be able to
effectuate service inside the state under Rule 4(d).4 6 With re-
spect to United States defendants, this dilemma will not often
arise, since as to such defendants there is generally no more
liberal a basis for venue than that provided by section 12-
transacting business. Thus it will rarely if ever occur that a
plaintiff would satisfy general venue statutes, but not section
12 venue requirements, and would thus wish to use section 12
solely as a service statute. As to alien defendants, however,
this situation could often arise, since section 1391(d) is far
more liberal as to venue than section 12."
A third qualification on section 12 as an extraterritorial
service statute is also in dispute. Some courts have held that,
whether or not the venue provision is satisfied, section 12 au-
thorizes only nationwide service of process, not worldwide service
of process.4" This view of section 12 is based on a statutory
45. In Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972), Judge Friendly analyzed section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa, id. at 1340, which is a venue and service of process provision modeled on 15
U.S.C. § 22. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1340 n.10. Judge Friendly stated that the process
clause of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1981) "speaks expressly only
to service of process." Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1340 (emphasis added).
46. See Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in Fed-
eral Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 IOWA L. REV. 485, 509 (1982).
47. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 509; infra notes 288-95 and accompanying text.
48. See Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 378 (D. Md. 1975)
(service of process under section 12 "may be made in any district where a corporation
is found or is an inhabitant") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); In re
Electric & Musical Indus., Ltd., Middlesex Eng., 155 F. Supp. 892, 894 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (process under section 12 runs only to judicial districts in which defendant is
found); In re Siemens & Halske, A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). All these
cases are arguably dictum as to section 12 and worldwide service. In none of these
cases was worldwide service actually attempted. In fact, in each of these cases, ser-
vice was actually upheld as granting a statutory basis of jurisdiction. The foreign
defendants were held to be found within the United States on the basis of their control
over American subsidiaries. Service on the subsidiaries-outside the forum state but
within the United States-was held to be proper section 12 service upon the foreign
parent. See infra notes 335-57 and accompanying text.
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construction that the clause "process may be served wherever
it [the corporation] may be found" refers back to the "any dis-
trict" language of the provision on venue.
A far more straightforward construction of the process
provision is that "wherever it may be found" means exactly
what it says. If Congress had wanted to limit service to the
judicial districts, it could have used the term "in which" to so
qualify the process clause.4 9 Moreover, a construction limiting
section 12 service to the United States would in some cases
mean that section 12 would provide venue but not jurisdiction.
This is because a foreign corporation may very well be "trans-
acting business" in a judicial district for venue purposes, but
will not be "found" there for jurisdictional process purposes.5 °
It is nonsensical to assume that the Congress intended section
12 to provide for venue in cases where jurisdiction would not
exist as a statutory matter. Accordingly, the better view
adopted by most courts is that section 12 authorizes worldwide
service wherever a corporate defendant may be "found"-
most commonly corporate headquarters but also including any
place where the corporation's officers or agents are engaged in
activity tantamount to the "doing business" test.
5
'
If the court takes a limited view of the extent of process
provided by section 12 then only those corporate defendants
"found" within the United States are subject to the statutory
49. This argument was made by Judge Friendly in Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), construing the process provi-
sion of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), which was modeled on
section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1973). The court in Leasco held that
§ 27 was a statutory grant ofjurisdiction which authorized worldwide service of pro-
cess.
50. The term "found," which is also used as a basis of venue, requires substan-
tially more contacts in the judicial district than does the term "transacts business."
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 370-71
(1927); infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text. However, section 12 does not
authorize service of process wherever defendant transacts business. See Note, supra
note 27.
51. See, e.g., Smokey's of Tulsa, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 453 F.
Supp. 1265, 1267 (E.D. Okla. 1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 262, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Ro-
meo, SpA, 244 F. Supp. 70, 77-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In addition, most courts have
construed the analogous provisions of the securities laws to provide for worldwide
service. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1340-41; Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norway Secs., Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 615, 617 (D.Or. 1984); Bucyrus-Erie, 550 F. Supp. at 1038-39.
For a further discussion of where a corporation may be "found," see infra notes
296-300 and accompanying text.
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grant ofjurisdiction provided by that section. Defendants not
found in the United States will have to be reached, if at all,
through the relevant long-arm statute.
The fourth limitation on section 12 as a grant ofjurisdic-
tion arises when plaintiff brings non-federal claims together
with an antitrust claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion. Pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine originally applied to
subject matter jurisdiction. Claims having no independent
federal basis of subject matter jurisdiction can nonetheless be
heard by a federal court if such non-federal claims arise out of
a common nucleus of operative fact with federal claims such
that one would ordinarily expect the claims to be decided in
one proceeding.5 2 Thus, the doctrine of pendent subject mat-
terjurisdiction is based on convenience and proceeds from the
proposition that since the federal claims will be heard in fed-
eral court anyway, it effectuates judicial economy to hear all
related claims in a single proceeding.
Pendent subject matter jurisdiction is permissible under
article III of the Constitution because related non-federal
claims are part of the federal "case." 53 The court must also
find that pendent jurisdiction has been at least implicitly au-
thorized by Congress.5 4 If the non-federal claim is related
enough to be a part of the constitutional case, and if no new
parties are brought in as a result, it is ordinarily presumed that
Congress has implicitly authorized pendent subject matter ju-
risdiction in order to effectuate convenience.55 In particular,
in antitrust actions a plaintiff routinely appends related state
law claims, e.g., tortious interference, breach of contract, un-
fair trade practices in violation of state law, to the federal anti-
trust claims.56 All of these claims, if related to the antitrust
52. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
53. Id. at 725.
54. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
55. Capra, Pendent Parties, Pendent Claims: A Solution to the Gordian Knot, Nat'l LJ.,"
Oct. 4, 1982, at 22, col. 1.
56. See, e.g., Buckeye Assocs., Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D.
Mass. 1985) (breach of contract, misrepresentation, tortious interference, deceptive
trade practices in violation of state law); see also Federated Dep't Stores Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394 (1981), in which Justice Blackmun, concurring, argues that plaintiff's
state antitrust claim is precluded by plaintiff's earlier federal antitrust action because
plaintiff should have brought the state claim in federal court originally under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
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claim, can be heard in federal court under the doctrine of pen-
dent jurisdiction.57
An analogous problem can arise in the resolution of the
personal jurisdiction issue, especially when the extraterritorial
service provisions of section 12 are used. If section 12 service
only applies to the federal antitrust claim, then extraterritorial
service as to the pendent state claim would be determined by
the relevant state long-arm statute. However, many long-arm
statutes are more limited than the section 12 service provi-
sions.58 Many require contacts within the state, which are not
necessarily required under section 12 59 and all long-arm pro-
visions are limited by fourteenth amendment due process stan-
dards, which may be more stringent than the fifth amendment
due process standards applicable to service under section 12.60
In sum, there will be cases in which section 12 statutory juris-
diction will exist as to the federal claim, but in which there is
no independent statutory grant of personal jurisdiction as to
the pendent state claim. In such a case, the question arises as
to whether the court can exercise pendent personal jurisdic-
tion over the state claim.
Case law is divided on the propriety of taking pendent
personal jurisdiction over a related state claim. Most cases
have arisen under the world-wide service provisions of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, and courts recently have consistently
exercised pendent personal jurisdiction thereunder. 61 Pen-
dent personal jurisdiction was also exercised over an antitrust
claim under the worldwide service provisions of the District of
Columbia Foreign Patentee Statute.62 However, when service
is made pursuant to section 12 of the Clayton Act, it has gener-
ally been presumed without discussion that personal jurisdic-
57. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
58. See Banco Ambrosiano S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464
N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984).
59. This is particularly true if section 12 service provisions can be used without
regard to the section 12 venue requirements. See supra notes 31-42 and accompany-
ing text.
60. See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., GRM v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307, 317-
18 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Ninth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
493 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372
F. Supp. 191, 196-97 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
62. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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tion as to non-federal claims must be established under the rel-
evant long-arm statute.63
It is submitted that the doctrine of pendent personal juris-
diction should be applied to antitrust cases. Since the defend-
ant will already be in federal court, it suffers no greater incon-
venience by defending a claim which by definition is a related
claim. The resulting convenience of trying the entire "case" at
one time will result in more efficient application of the anti-
trust laws, thus comporting with the intent of Congress in
passing the broad provisions of section 12.64 Moreover, while
pendent personal jurisdiction, like all assertions of personal ju-
risdiction, must be statutorily authorized,65 section 12 can be
read, in light of its broad intent, to implicitly authorize pen-
dent personal jurisdiction over non-federal claims.
The process provision of section 12 authorizes service for
"cases" under the antitrust laws. There is no reason to con-
strue the term "case" any differently under section 12 than
under article III of the Constitution.66 "Case" is appropriately
defined as all claims arising from a common nucleus of opera-
tive fact. This includes related state claims even though no in-
dependent service provision is available. In light of the above
arguments, at least one court has exercised pendent personal
jurisdiction over a non-federal claim in an antitrust action.67
3. In-State Service on Affiliated Corporations
An exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court is
statutorily authorized by Rule 4 when service can be made
within the state. However, if service is to be made outside the
state, jurisdiction is authorized only by way of a state long-arm
63. See, e.g., Buckeye Assocs., Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484, 1491-
92 (D. Mass. 1985); Sportmart, Inc. & Olympic Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp.
1254, 1256 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D.
Md. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo,
244 F. Supp. 70, 77-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (section 12 does not apply to related claim
under Auto Dealers Act; state long-arm provisions must be used).
64. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 804 (1948).
65. See generally Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (statutory requirements
for pendent subject matter jurisdiction).
66. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
67. United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp.
565, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See generally R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 5.03[7]; Com-
ment, Removing the Cloak of Personal Jurisdiction From Choice of Law Analysis: PendentJuris-
diction and Nationwide Service of Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 127 (1982).
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statute or a special federal statute such as section 12 of the
Clayton Act. Rule 4(d)(3) authorizes in-state service upon a
foreign corporation "[b]y delivering a copy of the summons
and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general
agent." Rule 4(d)(1) further provides for in-state [or] personal
service of an individual defendant. 68 Finally, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
allows such in-state service to be made by mail. Of course, if
such an agent of an alien corporation happens to be in the
state, or if an individual defendant happens to be in the state
and is personally served, the federal statutory basis ofjurisdic-
tion has been satisfied. 69 A remaining question is whether
plaintiff can serve an in-state agent employed not by the alien
corporation, but rather by a corporate affiliate of such corpora-
tion or individual. Can the "corporate veil" of the in-state cor-
poration be "pierced" so that service on the in-state corpora-
tion is deemed a statutorily authorized assertion ofjurisdiction
over the non-resident? 7
0
The basic rule with respect to the exercise of statutory ju-
risdiction over a non-resident because of the in-state location
of an affiliate is that the non-resident must control the affiliate
to such an extent that the affiliate is an "alter ego" or "mere
department" of the non-resident.7 ' In antitrust cases, the
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) provides:
(d) Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served. The summons and complaint
shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making ser-
vice with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or
by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by deliv-
ering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.
69. See, e.g., Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Delta Steamships Lines, Inc. v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728,
730 (5th Cir. 1985) (mailed service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is a statutory grant of
jurisdiction for service within the state). Of course, the exercise of statutory jurisdic-
tion must comport with due process. See infra notes 81-219 and accompanying text.
70. This question will arise whenever the section 12 service provision may not
authorize extraterritorial service, e.g., as to individual defendants, pendent claims,
questions as to service outside the United States, etc.
71. Levin v. Garfinkle, 514 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Bulova Watch
Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See
generally R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 3.02[2][6] (description of standards for service
upon an agent); S & S Indus., Inc. v. Nakamura Precision Indus. Co., Ltd., 93 F.R.D.
564 (D. Minn. 1982) (service of process on a wholly owned subsidiary was sufficient
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question of corporate affiliate relationships usually arises in the
context of whether the non-resident is "transacting business"
in the judicial district through the corporate affiliate for pur-
poses of the venue requirements of section 12. If conduct of
an affiliate can be so attributed for purposes of transacting
business, then the court will ordinarily find a statutory basis of
jurisdiction under section 12 as well.7 2 Accordingly, the stan-
dards for attributing in-state affiliate activity to a non-resident
in antitrust actions will be considered more fully in terms of
the "transacting business" ground of section 12 venue.
4. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
The doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction was developed to
allow plaintiffs to attach a defendant's property located in the
forum as a way of forcing the defendant to defend there. It
was justified as an assertion of jurisdiction over defendant's
property, not over the defendant.73 The situations in which
quasi in rem jurisdiction can be constitutionally asserted has
been drastically curtailed by Shaffer v. Heitner.4 However, as a
matter of statutory jurisdiction, subject, of course, to constitu-
tional limitations, assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over
defendant's property is regulated by Rule 4(e) of the Federal
Rules. Rule 4(e) provides that quasi in rem attachment of
property is limited to property found in the state in which the
district court sits; statutory authority for such jurisdiction must
be found under state law. This reference to state law is not,
however, as problematic as is the application of the various
service of process on Japanese corporation when subsidiary was merely a "marketing
arm").
72. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 499 F. Supp. 829, 837 (D.
Ore. 1980); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). Whether an in-state affiliate is an agent for service under
Rule 4 could be considered distinct from whether it is an alter ego or whether it is
transacting business for the non-resident, but that distinction has not been made in
the cases. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.03[5]. Also, it seems logically possible
that a non-resident defendant may transact business through a subsidiary and yet
may not be "found" in that district for purposes of the service provisions of section
12. This would present a problem in courts which hold service of process under
section 12 to be limited to the United States; it would mean that venue would exist
under section 12, but not statutory jurisdiction. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
73. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 217 (1905).
74. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see infra notes 176-87 and accompa-
nying text.
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long-arm statutes. States routinely and consistently provide a
statutory basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction over property lo-
cated within the state.75 However, while statutory jurisdiction
consistently extends to property located in the state, the man-
ner in which such jurisdiction is asserted varies from state to
state.76 Because Rule 4(e) incorporates such standards, refer-
ence must be made to the procedural requirements of the state
in which the federal court sits.
The Sherman Act 77 and the Wilson Tariff Act 78 both pro-
vide for statutory jurisdiction on a quasi in rem basis over
property owned by foreign corporations. 79 These provisions
have not been invoked since 1931.8o
B. Constitutional Limitations: Minimum Contacts
The exercise of personal jurisdiction may violate the Con-
stitution even if it is statutorily authorized."' The Supreme
Court has consistently stated that the due process clause im-
poses limits on a court's exercise of statutorily authorized ju-
risdiction. 2 All of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction
decisions have dealt with the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause. The Court has not stated whether due process
considerations are different when it is the fifth amendment due
process clause that controls the federal court.83 Nonetheless,
75. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw & RULES § 6201 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:26-2 (West Supp. 1986).
76. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 3.05.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1982).
79. Section 6 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1976), provides:
Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant
to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section 1 of
this act, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another
or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States and may be
seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the
forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United
States contrary to law.
80. See generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 108-
11 (2d ed. 1978).
81. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Capra, supra note 2, at 1034-40.
82. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 245 (1958); see Capra, supra note 2, at
1040-42.
83. A federal court is not subject to the fourteenth amendment by its terms and
is subject instead to restrictions imposed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. See Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251,
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the Court's fourteenth amendment cases are at least relevant,
and at times controlling authority in limiting the assertion of
personal jurisdiction by the federal courts-even in federal
question cases.
Due process requires an adequate basis or predicate for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction, as well as adequate notice
to defendant of the action. Under the famous case of Pennoyer
v. Neff,8 4 the Supreme Court held that the presence of the de-
fendant or his property in the state was the only basis upon
which jurisdiction could constitutionally be asserted. The
Court in Pennoyer stressed that due process guaranteed that
one state could not, by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons not present within the forum, intrude upon the
sovereign" rights of its sister states.8 5 With respect to corpo-
rations, which are not physically present anywhere, the Court
later promulgated a doctrine of "doing business," a concept
which signified such substantial in-state activity that the corpo-
ration could be deemed "present" within the forum.8 6
The modern era of easy communication and transporta-
tion, with burgeoning interstate and international commerce
made it obvious that the presence theory was too limiting.
Thus, in Milliken v. Meyer s7 the Court held that it was constitu-
tionally permissible to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially
over a domiciliary who was temporarily absent from the state.
Subsequently, in the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,"8 the Court stated that the defendant's presence
within the forum was no longer necessary. Where the defend-
ant is not present, jurisdiction can be asserted consistently with
the due process clause so long as the defendant has certain
"minimum contacts" with the forum such that asserting juris-
diction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
256 (5th Cir. 1981); Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence ofJurisdiction, 58
So. CAL. L. REV. 913, 937 (1985).
84. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
85. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (sovereignty limitations stated in Pen-
noyer improperly borrowed from international law); Capra, supra note 2, at 1035.
86. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See
generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In PersonamJurisdiction
of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
87. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
88. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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stantial justice. "89
This minimum contacts test promulgated by International
Shoe is obviously vague and uncertain. Many questions have
been raised concerning the application of the minimum con-
tacts test, some of which have not been answered after forty
years of litigation. In the following discussion of these mini-
mum contacts questions, it must be remembered that any mini-
mum contacts case is obviously fact-specific. No case is abso-
lute authority as to any other.90
1. What Kind of "Contact" Will Count Toward
the "Minimum"?
The Supreme Court has held that not every relationship
between the defendant and the forum is relevant to the mini-
mum contacts inquiry. 9' For instance, the "mere" fact that the
defendant has caused injury in a state is not sufficient to estab-
lish minimum contacts there. Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson,9 2 the presence of an automobile in the forum was not
attributable to the retailer of the automobile as a "contact"
since the consumer had driven the automobile into the forum.
Similarly, "merely" contracting with a party who happens to be
from another state does not mean that defendant has a consti-
tutionally cognizable contact with that state.93 Likewise, the
"mere" acceptance of a directorship of a corporation is not a
countable contact with the state of incorporation, at least
where the state has not notified that director that acceptance of
the directorship is tantamount to submission to jurisdiction.94
What is lacking in all the above cases, and what is required
in all minimum contacts cases, is "some act by which the de-
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
89. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). This mini-
mum contacts test applies to both corporate and individual defendants. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
90. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). "We recognize that
this determination is one in which few answers will be written in black and white.
The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable." Id
(citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
91. See generally Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77.
92. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
93. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, -, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184
(1985).
94. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
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activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." 95 The purposeful availment test basi-
cally requires a voluntary, controllable submission to the au-
thority of the forum. As the Supreme Court has stated, if the
contact is derived from the "unilateral activity" of a third
party, it is not purposeful or controllable as to the defendant,
hence cannot count toward the minimum necessary for due
process.96
The reason for the purposeful availment test of minimum
contacts is that it "gives a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."' 97 The
fallacy of any theory based on "predictability" and "expecta-
tion", however, is that it is inherently tautological and content-
neutral. Predictability is the result of clearly established law
but this "predictability" alone is no basis for deciding which of
many clear laws should be established. Likewise, "expecta-
tion" depends on what the law is. If the Court had held in
World-Wide Volkswagen that the "mere" presence of the car was a
countable contact, the retailer would know exactly what to ex-
pect in the next case. In short, the minimum contacts test has
been encrusted with a strict purposeful availment/expectation
test which limits the expansiveness promised by the analytically
vacant International Shoe case, and leads to results which are not
explainable in terms of fairness.98
95. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
96. This was the case in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980), where the presence of the exploding automobile was considered the uni-
lateral activity of the consumer who drove the car into the forum. See also Kulko v.
Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (presence of children in forum was not
controllable by divorced parent); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984) (checks drawn on Texas bank not controllable by payee).
97. Burger King, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
98. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (director shareholders of Dela-
ware corporation, receiving benefits under Delaware law, are not subject to jurisdic-
tion in Delaware for corporate mismanagement); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) (most convenient forum for all parties cannot assert jurisdiction because no
purposeful availment by stakeholder trustee); Miller v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 779
F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1985) (major multinational corporation which sells millions of dol-
lars of products in state through a controlled network of distribution is not subject to
jurisdiction).
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2. What Type of Contacts are Considered Purposeful
and Controllable Enough to Count Toward
the Minimum?
While the minimum contacts test is fact-specific, some
generalizations can be drawn about the type of activity which is
likely to be purposeful.
Efforts to market a product in the state-whether directly
by in-state sales or indirectly through a distribution network or
"stream of commerce"-will ordinarily be deemed purposeful
availment.99 Thus, the retailer in World-Wide Volkswagen did not
have minimum contacts with the forum when it had made no
effort to market its cars there. However, the court indicated
that the case would have been different if such an effort had
been made.' 0 Purchasing goods in the forum has sometimes
99. Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stultz Wine Distributors Pty, Ltd.,
647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Australian trademark defendants subject to jurisdic-
tion where it ships goods to an intermediary with the expectation that the intermedi-
ary will distribute the goods in a region that includes the forum); Oswalt v. Scripto,
Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (importer subject to jurisdiction in Texas where
lighters are distributed through chain of distribution).
100. The Court cited favorably the famous case of Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 436, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which jurisdiction
was upheld over a component part manufacturer with respect to a product that had
found its way into Illinois through a stream of commerce. See Bean Dredging Corp.
v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (where manufacturer,
importer and distributor promote stream of commerce in effort to sell products in
the forum, jurisdiction can be asserted there); Rockwell Int'l v. Costruzioni Aeronau-
tiche Giovanni Augusta, SpA, 553 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (defendant parts re-
placement manufacturer subject to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania where it decided to
exploit the international market and developed its parts knowing that they would be
components of helicopters marketed throughout the United States. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), can be distinguished in that
defendant herein decided to serve, directly or indirectly, the largest possible market
for its product.) There are, however, some contrary decisions in the lower courts
about the viability of stream of commerce amenability after World-Wide Volkswagen.
See Miller v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 779 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1985) (in personam juris-
diction lacking over a Japanese corporation where vehicles manufactured for Japa-
nese corporation were sold in Massachusetts by authorized dealers who purchased
them from Japanese corporation's wholly-owned California subsidiary); Humble v.
Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., 727 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1984) (component part manufacturer
does not engage in purposeful activity in state where automobile is distributed and
sold in the stream of commerce). The courts which refuse to find purposeful activity
through participation in stream of commerce are unreasonably allowing corporate
defendants to benefit from the exploitation of an in-state market, without allowing
the state to impose a fair burden of litigation in return. Such a windfall to defendants
in the stream of commerce is unwarranted even after World-Wide Volkswagen. The
Supreme Court has recently decided to clarify the distinction, if any, between unilat-
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been found to be sufficiently purposeful, at least where the de-
fendant is not a simple mail order purchaser.'' Physical pres-
ence in the forum is not required in order for such a purchase
to be a countable contact.'0 2
After Calder v. Jones, "3 a defendant will be found to be pur-
posefully availing himself of the forum when he has intention-
ally created a harmful effect in the forum, even if the defendant
never entered the forum physically, or through an agent. The
Calder "effects" test is obviously pertinent to whether a defend-
ant who causes antitrust injury in the forum has engaged in
purposeful activity there. Like the libel in Calder, an antitrust
violation is a tort-based, intentional creation of an effect on the
plaintiff. Like the plaintiff in Calder, plaintiffs in an antitrust
action will allege that purposeful contact with the forum is
eral consumer activity and efforts to market through the stream of commerce. Asahi
Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985)
(jurisdiction exercised over component parts manufacturer that made no direct sales
into California, but sold substantial number of its parts incorporated into finished
product sold in California through stream of commerce), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1258
(1986).
101. See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Eye Encounter, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 467, 274
S.E.2d 391 (1981); Kemper v. Rohrich, 508 F. Supp. 444 (D. Kan. 1980); Pedi Bares,
Inc. v. P & C Food Mkt., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977). For an example of
concern over the supposed jurisdictional plight of mail order purchasers, see Geneva
Indus. v. Copeland Constr. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1970). See R.
CASAD, supra note 26, at 8.01[2][b].
102. See Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (7th
Cir. 1985); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Mkt., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
However, a finding of purposefulness based on an agreement to purchase in-state
goods or services is not inevitable. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountainstate
Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) and
the cases cited therein.
103. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Calder was a libel case in which an
author and an editor libeled a California plaintiff in a newspaper article that was writ-
ten in Florida and published in a nationally distributed magazine. The Court found
minimum contacts existed because the individual defendants had purposefully cre-
ated harmful effects in the plaintiff's state. Id. at 790. The Court found the pur-
poseful nature of the in-state effects to be enhanced by the fact that plaintiff resided
in California. In other words, plaintiff was a target for defendant's acts under the
facts of the case, since the article described plaintiff's activity in California, and de-
fendant knew plaintiff resided there. Id. at 789-90. Under these circumstances, de-
fendants would not be heard to argue that they were surprised that their activity
would have an effect in California. See also Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.
1985) (Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), did not mean that intentional effects
were created in forum merely because plaintiff resides there; where gravamen of ac-
tivity is in California, no purposeful activity could be found in plaintiff's forum state
of Illinois).
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clear since the plaintiff, located in the forum, was a "target" of
the defendant's activity.'0 4 As in Calder, the court will properly
hold that a defendant need not physically enter the forum to
be subject to jurisdiction for intentional creation of effects
there.
In sum, Calder is strong authority for the assertion ofjuris-
diction over antitrust defendants in any forum to which the ef-
fects of their conduct may be targeted. Given the pervasive
nature of an antitrust injury, the constitutionally permissible
fora for an antitrust injury may indeed be broad even under
the fourteenth amendment. 0 5 The target/effects test had, in
fact, been applied to antitrust actions before it was specifically
authorized by Calder.10 6 It can be anticipated that it will be
more broadly applied after the Calder imprimatur.
It could be argued that the target theory is an inappropri-
ate test since it confuses jurisdictional issues with the merits of
a case. For instance, in an antitrust action, the jurisdictional
target theory is based on intentionally creating a harmful effect
upon plaintiff which is basically what must be proven at trial.
However, tests for personal jurisdiction are often merit-
based. 10 7 Courts have solved this problem by requiring only
104. See Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesman, A.G., 432 F. Supp.
659, 668 (D.N.H. 1977) (antitrust violations subject defendants to jurisdiction be-
cause defendant's activity was "directly aimed at the plaintiff in New Hampshire ....
[and defendant] cannot avoid the consequences of its deliberate tortious acts by hid-
ing behind jurisdictional technicalities. The traditional notions of justice and fair
play should not be used to extend a cloak of immunity over deliberate torts merely
because the defendant is an alien corporation. To do so would be to deny justice and
fair play to the plaintiff.").
105. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 492; Black v. Acme Mkts., 564 F.2d 681
(5th Cir. 1977).
106. See Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp.
659 (D.N.H. 1977). In Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933
(D.D.C. 1981), the court in a pre-Calder case rejected the "target" theory because it
was merit-based. Yet, the court failed to recognize that a prima facie test is often
used as to merit-based jurisdictional questions. For further applications of personal
jurisdiction based on targeted effect of antitrust injury within the forum, after prima
facie showing of such effects, see Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685 (5th
Cir. 1977); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977);
Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., Inc., 383 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moriates, 377
F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 338
F. Supp. 842 (D. Or. 1972).
107. For instance, long-arm statutes establish statutory jurisdiction for "tortious
acts." See ILL. STAT. ANN., ch. 110, § 2-209(2) (1983). Whether the act is "tortious"
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prima facie proof of the merit-based question at the jurisdic-
tional level.' 0 8 The Supreme Court in Calder presumed that
the same prima facie standards would apply to the "intentional
creation of effects" test.' 09 Accordingly, the "targeted effects"
test of purposeful availment is properly applied to defendants
causing antitrust injury within the forum.
When a co-conspirator has committed acts within the fo-
rum state in furtherance of a conspiracy, those acts have been
attributed to non-resident co-conspirators as their own pur-
poseful and countable contacts."10 Such an attribution of pur-
posefulness is obviously important in antitrust actions in which
one of the co-conspirators is acting in the forum in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Under the co-conspiracy theory, the in-state
contacts are counted against all co-conspirators. "'
The co-conspirator theory of minimum contacts does not
apply merely because a member of the conspiracy resides in
the forum or engages in activity there." 2 Rather, the in-state
activity must be an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
and the product of a common tortious intent among the con-
spirators in order to be attributed as purposeful availment to
all the conspirators." 13
As with the "effects" test, the co-conspirator theory is sub-
is a merits question. See generally Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substan-
tive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1986).
108. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); R. CASAD, supra
note 26, at 4.0311].
109. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
110. Textor v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1983)
(acts of resident defendant in furtherance of the conspiracy are attributable to all co-
conspirators for purposes of jurisdiction); United States Dental Inst. v. American
Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (non-resident defendants
committed a significant overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy which permitted Illi-
nois court to acquire jurisdiction). See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 107, at 19-21.
111. See Cofinco Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., A.C., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) $
60,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (New York acts of importer defendants in furtherance of con-
spiracy bind Angolan exporters and selling agents for jurisdictional purposes); Cher-
okee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., Inc., 383 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); see also R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.03[1].
See generally Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam Jurisdiction: A
Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 234 (1983).
112. See Weinstein v. Morris Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,750 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Althouse, supra note 111, at 242.
113. See American Land Program v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V.,
710 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1983) (non-resident defendant must be shown to have con-
spired with in-state actors to cause harm to plaintiff).
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ject to the criticism that it is merits-based." 14 However, as with
any merits-based basis of jurisdiction, conspiracy need only be
proven by a prima facie standard at the jurisdictional level." '
The co-conspirator theory of minimum contacts must be
distinguished from the co-conspirator theory of "transacting
business" for purposes of venue under section 12 of the Clay-
ton Act. Courts have generally rejected the argument that a
non-resident can be transacting business in the judicial district
through the residence of the co-conspirator."t 6 However, this
rejection, whether right or wrong, does not bear upon whether
a non-resident's membership in a conspiracy should allowjuris-
diction based upon the in-state activity of a co-conspirator."17
Some courts have improperly confused jurisdiction and venue
when a co-conspiracy theory has been argued." t 8
It is possible to find purposeful, countable contacts by
combining the co-conspiracy theory with the "effects" test of
Calder. If a co-conspirator commits an overt act outside the fo-
rum in furtherance of the conspiracy, by which act the co-con-
spirator intentionally creates a harmful effect within the forum,
then all of the non-resident co-conspirators can be held to
have committed a purposeful act within the forum."t 9
Purposeful activity can be found by the presence of a cor-
114. See Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933 (D.D.C. 1981);
Ahhouse, supra note 111, at 247-51.
115. R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.03[2]; Textor v. Board of Regents of N. I11.
Univ., 711 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1983); Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1984)
(conclusory allegations of conspiracy insufficient to establish jurisdiction), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3531 (1985), El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (prima facie standard applied to jurisdictional ques-
tion; "whether the plaintiff will be able to sustain its burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence at trial is an entirely different question which is not now before
us"). Of course with a complicated and merits-based issue such as antitrust conspir-
acy, jurisdictional discovery, as well as the ultimate jurisdictional decisionmaking may
become quite involved. See Althouse, supra note 111, at 256-59 (proposing a method
of proof for early decisionmaking in accord with standards for preliminary injunc-
tions).
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.0311] n.263.
118. See, e.g., Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933 (D.D.C.
1981).
119. Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (economic injury to persons in the state resulting from overt acts in further-
ance of a price-fixing conspiracy outside the state was sufficient to subject defendant
conspirators to jurisdiction for claims arising from the conspiracy).
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porate affiliate within the forum.1 2' The most common prob-
lem is where a non-resident parent is argued to be purpose-
fully availing itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of
the forum through the activities of a local subsidiary. How-
ever, purposeful activity by a non-resident cannot be found
merely because there is jurisdiction over a corporate affili-
ate.' 2 1 Very generally, purposeful activity by the non-resident
will be found only by "piercing the corporate veil" of the local
defendant. 22 Attribution of purposefulness is typically based
on a finding of "alter ego", "mere department" or "marketing
arm".1 23 Common ownership, common directorship, and even
sole ownership, without more, is not enough to attribute pur-
posefulness to the non-resident based upon the acts of an in-
state affiliate.' 24 The courts focus upon actual control by the
non-resident over decisions that one would expect the local
corporation to decide for itself as a matter of normal corporate
practice. 125 A lack of formal separateness or undercapitaliza-
tion of the local corporation is clearly helpful in piercing the
120. Williams v. Canon Inc., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,749 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
121. Id.
122. See Flynt Distrib. Co. Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1984) (non-
signatory subject to jurisdiction on basis of contracts signed by signatory corporation
in the state; all such corporations are alter-ego of sole shareholder); Hargrave v.
Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983) (parent must be one and the same
corporation as the subsidiary); Sportmart, Inc. and Olympic Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch,
537 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (in order to support the exercise of jurisdiction
and venue over a foreign corporation, the relationship between the foreign and local
corporation must be such that one is merely the alter ego of the other).
123. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 3.01[2][6][ix]; MCI Communications Corp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,652 (D.D.C. 1983); see
also Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 923 (1977) (oil company which used subsidiary as its marketing arm, which con-
trolled subsidiary's decisions through the use of its own officers in subsidiary posi-
tions and by the execution and implementation of major marketing study of subsidi-
ary's potential was subject to jurisdiction in Maryland).
124. See, e.g., Ryder Truck Rental v. Acton Foodservices Corp., 554 F. Supp. 277
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (sole ownership of subsidiary by parent is not enough to subject
parent to suit); 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.25[6].
125. See Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Ill.
1984). However, the fact that the subsidiary must seek permission for major capital
expenditures is not sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, since such permission is
ordinarily required from shareholders for major expenditures. King v. Johnson Wax
Assoc., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711 (D.C. Md. 1983) (in the absence of accompanying
evidence of control over ordinary business operations, defendant's approval of cer-
tain capital expenditures is not sufficient to attribute subsidiary's activity to defend-
ant).
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corporate veil, 126 but is not absolutely necessary to a finding
that a non-resident exercised actual and substantial control
over the activity of a local corporation.
1 27
As with the effects test and the co-conspirator theory, the
alter ego or mere department theory is merit-based in that the
plaintiff is usually seeking to hold the parent substantively lia-
ble for the subsidiary's acts, as well as amenable to jurisdiction
on the basis of such acts. Just as with the other merit-based
jurisdictional concepts, the problem is solved by requiring
plaintiff to show prima facie evidence at the jurisdictional level,
and a preponderance at trial.'
28
The question of whether it is proper to attribute contacts
to a corporate affiliate for jurisdictional purposes is distinct from
the question of whether a non-resident is "transacting busi-
ness" through a corporate affiliate for purposes of venue
under section 12 of the Clayton Act. 12 9 Courts have often con-
fused minimum contacts analysis with venue questions under
section 12."3 While the result may properly be the same as to
both jurisdiction and section 12 venue where an alter ego rela-
tionship is found, it is appropriate to analyze the questions
separately: jurisdiction deals with the power of the court to
hear a case, whereas venue deals with trial convenience.'
31
126. See Ryder Truck Rental v. Acton Foodservices Corp., 554 F. Supp. 277
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (no alter ego where plaintiff failed to show prima facie proof that
corporate formalities were not maintained, or that the subsidiary was undercapital-
ized); Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (no lack of formal
separateness of parent and subsidiary and no showing that subsidiary was undercapi-
talized).
127. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (finding of "sham" not required; jurisdiction found through controlling fi-
nances); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan.
1978) (rejecting the strict Canon formal separation test as not constitutionally re-
quired, in favor of a test focusing on actual control in attributing purposefulness).
128. See Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 107, at 8-15.
129. See infra notes 300-63 and accompanying text.
130. See Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (analysis of section 12 venue provision to determine personal jurisdiction
through subsidiary's activity within the forum); Ryder Truck Rental v. Acton Food-
services Corp., 554 F. Supp. 277 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (jurisdictional decision based on
incorrect reliance on section 12 cases). For decisions where the court separated the
due process requirements of personal jurisdiction from the statutory venue require-
ments, see O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974); Wil-
liams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
131. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 507, 517-18.
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Purposeful contact between the defendant and the forum
can be found where the non-resident has expressly or im-
pliedly authorized an agent to act on its behalf in the forum.,3 2
A non-resident can be found to be engaging in purposeful ac-
tivity through the agency of a totally independent corpora-
tion. 13 In fact, the stream of commerce theory and the co-
conspirator theory are merely particularized applications of a
general doctrine that the in-state activity of an agent who is
authorized either implicitly or explicitly to act on behalf of a
non-resident can be attributed to that non-resident for pur-
poses of jurisdiction. The general test is whether, if the in-
state actor did not engage in such activity, the non-resident de-
fendant would have to engage in such activity on its own be-
half. ' 4
Of course, if a non-resident can be held to engage in pur-
poseful activity in the state through the acts of a totally in-
dependent corporation, it follows that an affiliated corporation
can be an agent for purposes of jurisdiction as well. Thus, the
alter ego theory is not the only way to attribute the in-state
contacts of an affiliate to a non-resident; if the in-state affiliate
is acting on behalf of the non-resident, and is engaging in ac-
tivity that the non-resident would otherwise have to do, then
the affiliate corporation should be deemed an agent for juris-
dictional purposes even if it is not an alter ego.13 5 The alter-
ego theory should be reserved for situations where all activity
132. See Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516 (11 th Cir.
1985) (personal jurisdiction found in contract case on basis of agency contacts where
negotiations were done by an independent party acting to benefit defendant to whom
defendant later paid a commission).
133. Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
134. See id.; Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n of the United States, 744 F.2d
731 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1878 (1985); Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori &
Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). It should be noted that as a statutory
matter, when it is necessary to resort to a long-arm statute, the typical "enumerated
act" statute covers activity conducted through an agent. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw &
RULES § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1986); R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.03[l].
135. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d
851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Stabilisierungsfonas Fur Wein
v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Almogy, 510 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Bulova
Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Parke-
Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337
(1970).
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is done by and purportedly on behalf of the in-state affiliate
itself, but where the plaintiff alleges such control over the in-
state affiliate by the non-resident that the corporate veil should
be pierced. The agency theory is applicable where the non-
resident is admittedly doing business through an affiliate, and
the only question is whether such business relationship estab-
lishes an agency-even if arm's length. Unfortunately, the dis-
tinction between the agency and alter ego theories of pur-
poseful contacts has often not been recognized by the
courts. 136 This misunderstanding has carried over to section
12 of the Clayton Act.
As with other theories of imputing purposeful contacts,
plaintiffs invoking the agency theory of jurisdiction are often
seeking to prove agency for substantive liability. The problem
of a merit-based jurisdictional determination is solved by re-
quiring no more than prima facie proof of agency to overcome
a jurisdictional objection. 137
Attendance at an alleged conspiratorial meeting in the fo-
rum will ordinarily be held to be purposeful activity without
regard to whether defendant or a co-conspirator committed an
overt act there. 3 8  Extensive contractual negotiations, by
phone or mail or in person, entering into long-term contracts
with a resident of the forum (e.g., a franchise relationship), or
in general, performing or agreeing to perform contractual ob-
ligations with significant contemplated consequences in the fo-
rum, will be found to be purposeful activity in the forum, re-
sulting in a finding of countable contacts therein. 39
136. For cases which have observed the distinction, see Puerto Rico Maritime
Shipping Auth. v. Almogy, 510 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. App. 3d 983, 134 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1976). For an egre-
gious case which has failed to recognize the agency theory, see Miller v. Honda Mo-
tor Co., Ltd., 779 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1985). Many courts fail to recognize that a
defendant could be transacting business through an agent/affiliate, even though
there is no alter ego relationship. See, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491
F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1974); Sportmart, Inc. and Olympic Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch,
537 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Amateur-Wholesale Elecs. v. R.L. Drake Co., 515
F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
137. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 403[1][a]; Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note
107, at 16-19.
138. El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 444 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 429 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
139. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985)
(long term franchise relationship gives rise to significant contemplated consequences
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Finally, if defendant maintains an office or place of busi-
ness in the forum, this will clearly be found to be purposeful
availment.' 41 Indicia of a place of business include bank ac-
counts, telephone listings, directors' meetings and business
correspondence. 4 '
3. How Many Contacts Constitute the Minimum Contacts?
The next question that arises in applying the minimum
contacts test is: presuming we have countable contacts, how
many are sufficient to equal the minimum? The Supreme
Court has stated that the minimum level of acceptable contacts
will vary depending on the nature of the cause of action
brought by the plaintiff. If the cause of action is related to or
arises out of the countable forum contacts, then even one indi-
cation of purposeful activity will be sufficient to comport with
due process. 14 2 Thus, in an antitrust action, if the cause of ac-
tion is based upon harm within the forum caused by defendant,
and such harm can be attributed to defendant as a matter of
purposeful activity, (e.g., by the theories of agency, effects, co-
conspirator, etc.) assertion of jurisdiction will ordinarily be
proper as a matter of due process. 4 '
On the other hand, if plaintiff's cause of action does not
relate to or arise from defendant's purposeful activity, then the
Supreme Court has required that defendant engage in sub-
stantial and continuous purposeful activity within the forum,
tantamount to a finding of permanence within the forum. 44 If
in the forum); DJ. Invest., Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754
F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1985); Mid-America, Inc. v. Shamaiengar, 714 F.2d 61 (8th Cir.
1983); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308
N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970) (extensive telephone negotiations during auction constitute
purposeful activity).
140. Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
141. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
142. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985)
(long term franchise gives rise to contemplated consequences in the forum); McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (single contract of reinsurance is
sufficient for minimum contacts with the state).
143. See, e.g., Myers v. American Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1982).
144. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(extensive in-state purchases and training programs insufficient to establish a show-
ing of substantial and permanent contact with the forum); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th
Cir. 1973). "The sufficiency of contacts threshold is elevated when the cause does
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a finding of permanence is warranted then defendant can be
held amenable to suit within the forum on any cause of action
consistent with due process requirements. Jurisdiction based
upon a finding of substantial and continuous activity is called
general jurisdiction; whereas jurisdiction based. on the cause of
action having a nexus to isolated (but purposeful) forum activ-
ity is referred to as specific jurisdiction."' 5
General jurisdiction is basically the same basis ofjurisdic-
tion as was found under the old "corporate presence" and
"doing business" tests before International Shoe.' 4 6  More re-
cently in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,"4 7 the
Supreme Court indicated that with respect to general jurisdic-
tion, the crucial question was whether defendant was engaging
in such substantial and continuous activity as to warrant a find-
ing of permanence within the forum; consequently, not all pur-
poseful activity would necessarily be relevant to a finding of
permanence. More specifically, the Court held that defend-
ant's substantial in-state purchases of helicopters and pilot train-
ing collateral to such purchases, would not warrant a finding of
permanence within the forum. 4 8 The Court indicated that the
case would have been different if defendant maintained an of-
fice within the forum,' 49 or had made substantial and continu-
ous in-state sales without a resident office.' 50 A finding of per-
manence supporting general jurisdiction could have then been
not arise in the forum state or derive from the foreign corporation's transactions in
the state." Id.; see Weinberg, supra note 83, at 914.
145. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate. A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
146. For instance, the contacts in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259,
115 N.E. 915 (1917), which were found by the court to warrant a finding of "pres-
ence," would today result in a holding that defendant was engaged in such substan-
tial and continuous activity in the forum that general jurisdiction was "fair." See, e.g.,
Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973) (general jurisdiction found
where defendant sent sales personnel into forum 75 to 85 days annually, resulting in
in-state sales of $100,000 annually).
147. 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984).
148. The Court relied on Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S.
516 (1923), which preceded International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), for this proposition. For a criticism of such reliance, see Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See also Henry R.Jahn & Son v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 49 Cal. 2d
855, 859, 323 P.2d 437, 440 (1958) (finding Rosenberg obsolete).
149. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
150. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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made.' 5 ' Thus, with respect to general jurisdiction, contacts
must not only be counted in terms of purposefulness, they
must also be weighed to determine whether the purposeful
contact creates an inference of permanence.
Specific jurisdiction is, on the other hand, based on isolated
contacts and any purposeful activity can support jurisdiction
for a related cause of action. Thus, if the cause of action in
Hall had been found to arise out of or to have been related to
the in-state purchases, jurisdiction would undoubtedly have
been upheld on the basis of the purposeful activity in buying
the helicopters. 52 It thus becomes important for a plaintiff to
trigger the category of specific jurisdiction; it avoids the prob-
lem of having to find many contacts of a certain variety.
Specific jurisdiction is obviously based on some nexus be-
tween the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's in-
state activity. However, the required degree of such nexus has
not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. 153 In the absence
of Supreme Court guidance, some courts and commentators
have used a very strict test for specific jurisdiction: that the
contact with the forum must be "substantively relevant" to the
cause of action in the sense that it is the gravamen of the dis-
pute out of which plaintiff's claim for relief "arises".' 5 4 Other
courts, recognizing that general and specific jurisdiction are
mere labels, have properly taken a more liberal view of the
nexus requirements. It has been noted that, in an action aris-
ing from out-of-state activity, the defendant ordinarily is not
more significantly burdened or unprepared to defend the ac-
tion in the forum than it would be if the action arose out of
purposeful in-state activity.' 55 These courts hold that so long
as the cause of action is generally related to the in-state activ-
151. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414-16.
152. Id. at 419-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 415-16 n.10.
154. See Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213 (1st Cir. 1984); Pearrow v. Na-
tional Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff injured at
Opry Land in Tennessee; fact that she was solicited in Arkansas to come to Tennes-
see is insufficient to invoke specific jurisdiction since the negligence in Tennessee did
not "arise out of" solicitation in Arkansas); Oregon ex rel La Manufacture Fran~aise
des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 207 (1982); Brilmayer,
supra note 91.
155. SeeJones v. North American Aerodynamics, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 657 (D. Me.
1985) (recognizing these points but following the First Circuit's inappropriately strict
nexus requirement in Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213 (1st Cir. 1984));
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ity-in the sense either that the cause of action lies in the wake
of the in-state activity or is one that defendant could generally
expect to defend in the forum-there is a sufficient nexus to
assert specific jurisdiction. 56
It should be noted that if plaintiff must resort to state stat-
utes for a basis of jurisdiction, most states have a statutory
scheme which is correlative to the constitutional categories of
specific and general jurisdiction. Thus, most states provide
statutory jurisdiction over any cause of action where defendant
engages in substantial and continuous activity within the
state 1 57 as well as for certain enumerated acts where the cause
of action arises from or is related to such acts.158 However, the
required degree of nexus between contact and cause of action
may, as a statutory matter, differ among the states.' 59 Further-
more, a few states do not provide a statutory basis for general
jurisdiction. In such states, the nexus requirement must be
satisfied or jurisdiction will be unobtainable. 60
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419-28 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
156. See Southwire Co. v. Trans-World Metals & Co., Ltd., 735 F.2d 440, 445
(11 th Cir. 1984) (cause of action was "sufficiently 'connected with' " prior negotia-
tion between the parties to support specific jurisdiction; cause of action was at end of
chain of events started by an earlier transaction in the state); Gates LearJet Corp. v.
Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1984) (cause of action for abuse of process and har-
assment in Philippines was sufficiently related to termination of a contract between
plaintiff and defendant in Arizona; "but for" termination of contract, defendant
would not have engaged in allegedly tortious activity in Philippines).
157. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw & RULES § 301 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
Section 301 authorizes general jurisdiction over defendants who are present or do
business in the forum.
158. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; R. CASAD, supra note 26, at A-
32-102.
159. Compare Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1068-
69 (8th Cir. 1983) (Arkansas long-arm statute requires strict nexus), with Hoffritz for
Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985) (under N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW
& RULES § 302, breach of contract need not occur in New York where defendants
transacted business in New York by negotiating the contract there); see Southwire Co.
v. Trans-World Metals & Co., Ltd., 735 F.2d 440 (11 th Cir. 1984) (Georgia long-arm
liberally construed as to nexus).
160. Smith v. De Walt Products Corp., 743 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1984) (Mississippi
long-arm does not provide for general jurisdiction).
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4. Are Any Other Considerations Beyond
Defendant's Contacts Relevant To A Finding
Of Minimum Contacts?
Arguably, factors other than those found in the single-in-
quiry defendant's contacts test should be relevant to whether
the assertion ofjurisdiction is fair for purposes of due process.
Plaintiff could argue that even if defendant's contacts do not
exist, or are insufficient to meet a "minimum", jurisdiction
would nonetheless be fair if plaintiff has an overriding conven-
ience interest in bringing the suit in a chosen forum. 16 ' Other
arguably relevant factors could include the forum's overriding
interest in hearing the case in terms of convenience of trial,
adjudication of conduct, and protection of in-state resi-
dents, 62 and that defendant suffers no substantial inconven-
ience by defending in the forum. 16  The defendant could, on
the other hand, argue that even if the defendant's contacts exist
the case should not be heard in the forum if the forum has no
legitimate interest in hearing the case, 164 if the plaintiff has not
chosen a particularly convenient forum to try the case,' 65 or if
the defendant would suffer substantial inconvenience by de-
fending in the forum. 1 66
The Supreme Court has often referred to the above fac-
tors-the plaintiff's interest, forum interest, trial convenience,
and burdens on the defendants-as relevant to whether it is
"reasonable" to assert jurisdiction under the due process
clause. 1 67  These reasonableness factors have not, however,
161. It may occur that if plaintiff is forced to bring the suit in a distant forum,
the suit would not be brought at all. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643 (1950). This is particularly true in an international antitrust case if the alterna-
tive forum lies abroad, in which case the plaintiff will be deprived of a remedy under
United States antitrust law. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 485.
162. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 256 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
163. See id.; Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary Pro-
cess, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 587, 618-30 (1979).
164. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
165. Id.
166. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
167. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the
burden on defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate
case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum
State's interest in adjudicating the dispute...; the plaintiff's interest in ob-
taining convenient and effective relief..., at least when that interest is not
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ever affected the result of any Supreme Court case. This is
because the Court has consistently held that the defendant's
contacts are a threshold inquiry; it is only after sufficient pur-
poseful contacts are found that reasonableness factors would
ever be relevant.' 68  For plaintiffs, therefore, the reasonable-
ness factors are totally useless since if the countable contacts
are insufficient, it does not matter how inconvenient it would
be for plaintiff to sue elsewhere, or whether the forum is inter-
ested in hearing the case, or that defendant would not be in-
convenienced by defending in the forum. There is no reasona-
bleness substitute for a lack of defendant's contacts.' 69
From defendant's point of view it could appear that rea-
sonableness factors would prevent jurisdiction even though
the defendant had purposeful contacts with the forum, but this
is not so. This is because if the defendant's contacts do exist,
sufficient forum interest in the case will exist almost by defini-
tion. 7 0 This is especially true after Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., i7i in which the Court found a constitutionally sufficient
state interest in hearing the case on a threshold so low that it is
hard to conceive of a case where defendant's contacts with the
forum will not give rise to such an interest.' 72 Moreover, Kee-
ton held that the fact that the plaintiff may have been forum
adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum...; the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental social policies.
Id. at 292 (citations omitted); see Burger King, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2174.
Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered
in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal juris-
diction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.'. . . Thus
courts in 'appropriate case[s]' may evaluate 'the burden on the defendant,'
'the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,' 'the plaintiff's inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,' and the
'shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.'
Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (citations omitted).
168. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
169. Weinberg, supra note 83, at 918.
170. See Lilly, supra note 23, at 107.
171. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
172. See id. (New Hampshire has sufficient interest in regulating libel claims aris-
ing outside the state as a cooperative effort with sister states, even though every other
state would have prohibited the claim as untimely).
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shopping was a question of choice-of-law, not jurisdiction. 73
Finally, with respect to overwhelming burdens of distant
litigation on the defendant, the Supreme Court in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz held that if sufficient purposeful contacts ex-
ist, the existence of burdens of distant litigation is generally a
question of venue, which deals specifically with trial conven-
ience. 174 In that case, the Court found it reasonable to require
an individual defendant to defend in a state 1500 miles away
when sued by a nationwide corporation. Thus, after Burger
King and Keeton, it is difficult to envision any case in which the
defendant can put the reasonableness factors to any use.175 In
practical effect, the sole inquiry for due process is whether the
defendant has engaged in sufficient purposeful activity in the
forum to trigger either specific or general jurisdiction, depend-
ing on the cause of action brought.
5. Is Presence Within The Forum Still A Constitutionally
Sufficient Basis of Jurisdiction?
A fair reading of International Shoe indicates that the
Supreme Court did not replace the traditional presence basis
of jurisdiction of Pennoyer; rather, the Court intended that the
minimum contacts test would supplement the presence doctrine,
thus expanding upon Pennoyer.176 Nonetheless, in two situa-
tions it is arguable that satisfaction of the traditional presence
standards will not satisfy the minimum contacts test. The
question after International Shoe is whether the assertion ofju-
173. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
174. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, -, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185
(1985).
175. Some courts, particularly the Ninth Circuit, are more prone to dismissing
jurisdiction on reasonableness grounds than appears warranted by Supreme Court
authority. See, e.g., Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d
1058 (9th Cir. 1985) (fraudulent demand for payment of California letter of credit is
a countable contact; but jurisdiction is not reasonable because, among other things,
the Bank of Kuwait would bear a heavy burden of defending in California, and juris-
diction would interfere with the sovereignty of Kuwait); see also Lilly, supra note 23, at
107.
176. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the Forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
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risdiction would in such cases be unconstitutional because
"unfair." These two situations are: 1) assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction over property present in the forum, but where the
cause of action has no relationship to such property;177 and
2) assertion ofjurisdiction over an individual defendant who is
served with process while present within the forum, but where
the cause of action has no relationship to such presence-a ba-
sis of jurisdiction known as "transient jurisdiction."' 178
As to quasi in rem jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
held that all assertions of jurisdiction over property are
equivalent to assertions of jurisdiction over the property
owner. Accordingly, as with personal jurisdiction, assertions
of quasi in rem jurisdiction must satisfy the minimum contacts
test. 179 This means that while property ownership is a pur-
poseful contact, if such contact is isolated, plaintiff's cause of
action must be sufficiently related to the property to support
specific jurisdiction.8 0 Of course, ownership of property is
usually not "mere" ownership; it is often indicative of other
contacts which would give rise to general jurisdiction.' 8 '
While generally requiring quasi in rem jurisdiction to
comport with minimum contacts, the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner
left open two situations in which the presence of property
would be itself sufficient for jurisdiction. Courts after Shaffer
have asserted jurisdiction in both situations. First, if there is
no other forum available in the United States, quasi in rem ju-
risdiction over property located within the forum can be sup-
ported under the doctrine ofjurisdiction by necessity. 82 This
177. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
178. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 86.
179. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
180. See, e.g., Spungin v. Chinetti Int'l Motors, 515 F. Supp. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(presence of automobile sufficient under Shaffer where cause of action dealt with title
to automobile); Banco Ambrosiano S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65,
464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984).
181. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208
N.E.2d 439 (1965) (maintaining office shows permanent and continuous activity). It
should be noted that even as limited by minimum contacts, the quasi in rem basis of
jurisdiction can be valuable to plaintiffs who must resort to state statutory jurisdiction
where the relevant long-arm statute is not as extensive as due process would allow.
In such a case, the state ordinarily provides a statutory basis for quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion that would only be limited by due process. See Banco Ambrosiano S.p.A. v.
Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984).
182. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977); Louring v. Kuwait
Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977).
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doctrine may be especially important as to foreign antitrust de-
fendants whose only countable contact with the United States
is the presence of a bank account.' 8 3 Second, quasi in rem ju-
risdiction can be used as an attachment device upon property
merely present in the forum to secure recovery of a judgment
sought in another forum in which minimum contacts do ex-
ist. 184
With respect to transient jurisdiction, while its premises
have been questioned after Shaffer,' 85 the courts which have
squarely considered the question have held that the ancient
doctrine of transient jurisdiction remains an appropriate basis
ofjurisdiction until it is specifically overruled.186 Thus, a mini-
mum contacts analysis is unnecessary if an individual defend-
ant is served within the forum. However, a minimum contacts
analysis will be necessary if the service seeks to bind any one
other than the individual defendant (e.g., a partnership, corpo-
ration or unincorporated association). There is no such thing
as transient jurisdiction over a defendant not physically pres-
ent in the forum. 187
6. Is Due Process Still Based on Sovereign Limitations
Between the States?
The original rationale for placing due process limitations
on state court jurisdiction was that the due process clause as-
sured that the forum state would not impinge upon the sover-
eign rights of defendant's state by an inappropriate extraterri-
torial assertion of forum state authority.' 88 While International
Shoe altered the test for due process, the Supreme Court re-
tained the notion that the function of due process was to impose
limitations on the forum state in order to protect the sovereign
183. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
184. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
185. Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985).
186. Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Humphrey v. Lang-
ford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980). These courts correctly conclude that any-
thing that Shaffer may have implied about transient jurisdiction is clearly dictum.
187. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915) (no
transiet jurisdiction over corporation by serving agent physically present in the
state); Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985) (minimum con-
tacts test must be applied to unincorporated association).
188. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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interests of sister states. 18 9 This doctrine of sovereignty and
interstate relations was removed from the interests of the ac-
tual litigants in any case. For instance, even if the defendant
would suffer no burden of distant litigation from defending in
the forum-thus, making it difficult to see how he would be
"deprived" of "life, liberty or property" by an assertion ofju-
risdiction-the defendant could nonetheless assert that mini-
mum contacts (and thus due process) had not been satisfied. 190
The defendant was allowed this windfall in order to protect the
supposed sovereign interest of his state in trying the case un-
less the defendant had minimum contacts with some other
state. 191
However, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Baux-
ites de Guinee,'92 the Supreme Court apparently recognized that
the due process clause has nothing to do with interstate sover-
eignty limitations. 193 By its terms the due process clause regu-
lates only the relationship between the state and the individ-
ual. "'94 The Court in Bauxites concluded that the due process
clause only regulates state court jurisdiction to the extent that
it protects the "individual liberty interest" of the defendant. 195
189. See Capra, supra note 2, at 1038.
190. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id. at 294. See generally Redish, Due Process, Federalism and PersonalJurisdiction: A Theoret-
ical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1112 (1981).
191. See Capra, supra note 2, at 1040-41. Some courts, in response to World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), have held that the sover-
eignty of a foreign defendant's nation is protected by the due process clause. See
Olsen v. Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984); Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transp.
Corp., 652 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This is clearly incorrect since even World-Wide
Volkswagen, the most sovereignty-oriented of all Supreme Court opinions, refers to
the due process clause as an instrument of "interstate federalism." 440 U.S. at 294.
192. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
193. Id. at 702-03 n.10.
194. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without clue
process of law .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No State shall.., deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, cl. 2; see Redish, supra note 190, at 1113.
195. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guin6e,
456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982).
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In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 19 6 the Court has reaffirmed its
apparent rejection in Bauxites of sovereignty limitations on a
state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. It would appear then
that if the defendant is not personally deprived of liberty or
property by an assertion ofjurisdiction-because not meaning-
fully inconvenienced-such defendant should not be heard to
complain about a lack of minimum contacts. Unfortunately,
even this modest advance from Pennoyer is weakened by Burger
King, which implied that the minimum contacts test was always
required because the due process clause requires predictable
results-presumably even if the defendant is not meaningfully
inconvenienced by an "unpredictable" result.' 97 Because pre-
dictability is not normally considered an independently pro-
tected interest under due process, 98 it is apparent that the
court is merely using predictability as a surrogate for the sov-
ereignty limitations held to be part of due process by Pennoyer
and World-Wide Volkswagen.' 9 9 In sum, sovereignty limitations
are not truly eradicated from fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess jurisdiction cases; in all cases, sovereignty or its surrogate,
predictability, requires a finding of minimum contacts even if
196. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 n.13
(1985).
197. See id. -, 105 S. Ct. at 2174.
By requiring that individuals have 'fair warning that a particular activity may
subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,' . . . the Due Pro-
cess Clause 'gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.'
Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (citation omitted). It should be noted that anything in
Burger King regarding due process requirements where defendant is not meaningfully
inconvenienced is dictum, since defendant in Burger King was inconvenienced by a
suit in Florida. Thus, an individual due process deprivation was clearly implicated in
Burger King.
198. It is generally held that a state can act as unpredictably and even arbitrarily
as it wishes so long as it does not deprive an individual of a constitutionally cogniza-
ble interest in life, liberty or property. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238
(1983); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See
generally Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and
Others under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984).
199. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). "But insofar as
the state's 'interest' in adjudicating the dispute is part of the fourteenth amendment
due process equation, as a surrogate for some of the factors already mentioned, we
think the interest [herein] is sufficient." Id. at 776 (citations omitted); see Capra, supra
note 2, at 1048-49.
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the defendant is not meaningfully inconvenienced by distant
litigation.
7. Does the Due Process Analysis Differ When the Exercise
of Jurisdiction is by a Federal Court in a Federal
Question Case?
The Supreme Court has discussed constitutional limita-
tions on personal jurisdiction solely in terms of the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, by its terms, is
not applicable to the federal government, and hence not di-
rectly applicable to a federal court. Thus, to the extent it is
subject to due process limitations, a federal court in a federal
question case can only be directly limited by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.20 °
In recent years, it has been consistently held that the limi-
tations imposed by the fifth amendment due process clause on
a federal court are different from the limits imposed by the
fourteenth amendment. 20 ' The courts have held as a constitu-
tional matter that "the judicial jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant does not relate to the geographical power of the
particular court which is hearing the controversy, but to the
power of the unit of government of which the court is a
part. ' ' 20 2 In other words, state boundaries have no special sig-
nificance for fifth amendment due process. The relevant fo-
rum in a federal question case in federal court is the United
States as a whole, and not the state in which the particular fed-
200. This is a unanimous holding of the courts. See Burstein v. State Bar of Cal.,
693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.
1981); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974); Dunham's,
Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
A federal court in a diversity case is likewise not directly limited by the four-
teenth amendment. However, under the Erie doctrine, it has generally been held that
a federal court in diversity can have no greater power as to personal jurisdiction than
the parallel state court. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Forum-
shopping would result from a contrary rule. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 5.01.
201. See Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdic-
tional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470 (1981).
202. EdwardJ. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381,
390 (S.D. Ohio 1967); see also Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974);
Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV.
967 (1966).
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eral court sits. 20
3
If the defendant is a United States domiciliary or citizen, it
follows that the minimum contacts test is inapposite because
there is no application of extraterritoial authority at all. The
relevant "territory" is the United States as a whole. 0 4 Thus,
the due process clause is implicated in an international anti-
trust case in federal court only when jurisdiction is asserted
across a sovereign border. It is only at that point that the mini-
mum contacts inquiry is even relevant. 20 5 It follows that the
federal court is not affected by the federalism limitations (or its
surrogate of "predictability") inherent in the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.20 6 This means that there is no
constitutional violation if jurisdiction is asserted in California
federal court over an antitrust defendant located in Florida-
even if the defendant has no contacts with California or any
other western state.20 7 Minimum contacts with any particular
203. Matter of Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3555 (1983); F.T.C. v.Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981); Fitzsim-
mons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying
Syndicate of Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
204. Trans-Asiatic Oil, Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984);
Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981); Mariash v. Morrill, 496
F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974); Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of Texas, 614
F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
205. F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981). One court has
stated that the validity of the "single sovereign" analysis of due process has been
eroded by the Supreme Court's analysis in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guin~e, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), which held that sovereignty
limitations were not part of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See GRM
v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Bamford v.
Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Tex. 1983). This reliance on Bauxites, which leads the
court to a general fairness balancing analysis, to determine whether fifth amendment
due process is satisfied, is misplaced. Bauxites merely held that sovereignty limitations
were no longer applicable to a state's extraterritorial assertion of personal jurisdiction.
It said nothing about a state's intraterritorial assertion of sovereign authority. In fact,
if anything, Bauxites eradicates sovereignty-based restrictions on the power of the fo-
rum. It can hardly be read to impose additional limitations upon the forum state or
country. If Bamford is correct, then a resident of Buffalo would have a constitutional
objection to suit in New York City in the absence of "minimum contacts" with the
city. The due process clause has never applied to intraterritorial assertions ofjuris-
diction. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); First Flight
Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ("[O]ne
fundamental principle of the Anglo-American law ofjurisdiction is that a sovereignty
has personal jurisdiction over any defendant within its territorial limits, and that it
may exercise that jurisdiction by any of its courts.").
206. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
207. Such a ruling is particularly warranted in antitrust cases, given the perva-
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state are irrelevant to fifth amendment due process. Of
course, the defendant may suffer substantial inconvenience in
defending such a suit. However, this is not a constitutional
problem with respect to intraterritorial jurisdiction: "the de-
fendant must look primarily to federal venue requirements for
protection from onerous litigation. ' 20 8
With respect to alien antitrust defendants (as well as to
other federal question defendants),not serveable in the United
States,209 the formal act of invoking jurisdiction-service of
process-would entail an extraterritorial assertion of personal
jurisdiction. The test for whether this comports with due pro-
cess is whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the
forum. However, for fifth amendment purposes, state lines are
irrelevant. The relevant constitutional forum with which to
evaluate minimum contacts is the United States, not the partic-
ular state in which the federal court sits. If the alien has mini-
mum contacts within the United States-national contacts-
fifth amendment due process would not be violated, regardless
of the state in which the case is brought.2 10 Thus for instance,
if an alien antitrust defendant makes sales of its products to
New York (or has sufficient purposeful activity throughout the
United States as a whole), such defendant could be subject to
jurisdiction in any federal court without violating fifth amend-
ment due process. 21 1 The same International Shoe test of pur-
sive nature of the antitrust injury. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 485. It is also
important in antitrust cases for all defendants to be subject to jurisdiction in the same
court. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no contri-
bution among antitrust defendants). This would not always be possible if each de-
fendant had to have minimum contacts with a particular state. Hovenkamp, supra
note 46, at 491-93.
208. Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted); accordJohnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (1st
Cir. 1984); F.T.C. v.Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981); Mariash v. Mor-
rill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
209. Aliens could be subject to service in the United States if they appoint (ex-
pressly or impliedly), an agent for service, or if they have an alter ego affiliate. See
supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. In such a case, the minimum contacts test
would be as irrelevant as with United States defendants.
210. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 383 (1985); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972); Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
211. See, e.g., Leasco v. Data Processing Equip. Corp., 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
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poseful activity, and the same categories of general and specific
jurisdiction apply to such a defendant; the only difference is
that the relevant contacts forum is the United States.2 12 Fur-
thermore, the sovereignty and federalism limitations which still
apply at least to some extent to the minimum contacts test
under the fourteenth amendment would not be applicable to
the fifth amendment national contacts test.21 3 If the defendant
is not personally inconvenienced by distant litigation, mini-
mum contacts should not even be required since there is no
independent sovereignty interest protected by the fifth amend-
ment due process clause.21 4
Of course, certain alien defendants will undoubtedly suf-
fer burdens of distant litigation when subject to the national
contacts test.2 1 However, any concern for defendant's incon-
venience is answered in several ways. If defendant has mini-
mum contacts with one or more states in the United States and
thus has to defend "abroad," any problem of incremental in-
convenience of being sued in one state instead of another does
not rise to a constitutional level.21 6 If the defendant has mini-
mum contacts with the United States but not with any particu-
lar state, having to defend in the United States at all would be
212. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.) (court
accepts national contacts test, but defendant has no minimum contacts with the
United States in this case; defendant made only isolated purchases within the United
States, and such purchases were not related to the cause of action), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 893 (1981).
213. Handley v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1984).
"When a federal court is hearing and deciding a federal question case there are no
problems of 'co-equal sovereigns'. That is a fourteenth amendment concern which is
not present in actions founded on federal substantive law. Thus... we will be con-
cerned only with whether the district court's assertion of jurisdiction unfairly bur-
dened [defendant] with the requirement of litigating in an inconvenient forum." Id.
at 1271.
214. Id.; see supra notes 188-99; Capra, supra, note 2, at 1041-42; Redish, supra
note 190, at 1133-44. It should also be noted that the national contacts approach
does not violate international law under which the sovereignty of constituent states
of a country is irrelevant to the country's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Lilly, supra note 23, at 127 n.155.
215. See Fullerton, supra note 19, at 1-10.
216. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("it might very well be neither unfair nor unreasonable as a matter of due
process to aggregate the nonforum contacts of an alien with his forum contacts or to
require an alien to litigate in one state both those causes of action which originate in
that forum state and those arising elsewhere in the United States") (citations omit-
ted); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selena, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lilly,
supra note 23, at 215.
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an inconvenience. However, this inconvenience is fairly im-
posed because in such a case an aggregate contacts test is ab-
solutely necessary to "avoid the risk that American plaintiffs
could not gain jurisdiction over alien defendants with scattered
contacts. '"217 It is especially necessary in antitrust cases given
the pervasive and scattered nature of antitrust injury. Finally,
and most importantly, any question of inconvenience incurred
in defending in one state instead of another is, according to
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Burger King, largely a
question of venue and not due process.2 t s If this is so as be-
tween sovereign states as it was in Burger King, it is clearly so as
to courts within a single sovereign, such as federal courts in
federal question cases.219
In sum, with a federal court in a federal question case
there is no constitutional violation in asserting personal jurisdic-
217. Lilly, supra note 23, at 117; Note, supra note 201, at 474-75. George v.
Omni Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (if
contacts not aggregated under national contacts' approach, these alien defendants
could not be sued anywhere in the United States; such a result is "unjust, inconve-
nient, and expensive" and would immunize defendants from liability). But see
Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 501-05 (hypothesizing that such a "scattered contacts"
problem would rarely, if ever occur). Professor Fullerton, who opposes the doctrine
of national contacts, nonetheless agrees that the doctrine must be applied to aliens to
avoid the risk of a "scattered contacts" problem. Fullerton, supra note 19, at 44
n. 194.
218. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S.-, -, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182
(1985). Cases which have rejected the national or aggregate contacts approach be-
cause it would impose unconstitutional burdens on either an alien or a United States
defendant did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's re-evaluation in Burger
King of defendant's inconvenience as being largely a venue question. See, e.g.,
Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. Fichet Bauche, 568 F. Supp. 405 (D. Va. 1983) (court
rejects national contacts doctrine because it would be unfair to subject alien defend-
ant to jurisdiction in Virginia on the basis of defendant's substantial business in New
York).
Leaving inconvenienced defendants to the comfort of the venue statutes is not a
complete remedy since the defendant loses its right to default and attack the judg-
ment at a later date. A venue objection (as well as a motion to transfer venue or to
dismiss for forum non conveniens) must be made in the rendering court, or it is
waived, whereas a jurisdictional objection can be preserved by defaulting in the ren-
dering court. See Fullerton, supra note 19, at 36-37. Also, venue transfer decisions,
and forum non conveniens decisions are far more discretionary than a ruling on lack
of jurisdiction or violation of due process. Id. However, the Supreme Court obvi-
ously considered these differences between venue and jurisdiction in Burger King, and
nonetheless decided that inconvenience suffered by a defendant is largely solved, if at
all, through venue.
219. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972).
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tion in any federal district court over all defendants who are
citizens or domiciliaries of the United States. It is also consis-
tent with due process in such a case to assert jurisdiction in any
federal court over an alien who has countable minimum con-
tacts with the United States. In both situations, defendants
must look to venue requirements to solve any problem of in-
convenience.
However, while the national contacts approach is constitu-
tionally possible, personal jurisdiction must be implemented by
a statute as an original matter.220 A statutory authorization of
jurisdiction is made by the legislature when it authorizes the
formal act of service of process. 22' Thus, if Congress autho-
rizes service of process over a defendant in a federal question
case as a formal jurisdictional act, then the only constitutional
limitations are those imposed by the fifth amendment and the
national contacts test. Congress must specify the jurisdictional
extent of service of process as a formal exercise of federal au-
thority over the defendant.
Unfortunately, the main provision for service of process in
a federal action, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules, 2 22 generally limits
the jurisdictional effectiveness of service to the state in which
the federal court sits. All the provisions made by Rule 4 for
the appropriate manner of service (including mailed service
under Rule 4(c)) are thus only effective if service is made
within the state's territorial limits. 223 Accordingly, if service is
220. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
221. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 3.01.
222. The Federal Rules are indirectly authorized by Congress under the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072. They are promulgated by the Supreme Court, and
Congress has the power to change or reject the Supreme Court's provisions.
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) provides:
(f) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a subpoena may
be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the dis-
trict court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or
by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state. In addition, per-
sons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional
parties to a pending action or a counterclaim or crossclaim therein pursuant
to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of
subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the state but within the
United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the
action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial; and
persons required to respond to an order of commitment for civil contempt
may be served at the same places. A subpoena may be served within the
territorial limits provided in Rule 45.
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made within the state under Rule 4 (e.g., personal service on
an individual defendant or an authorized corporate agent who
happens to be within the state), then federal statutory jurisdic-
tion exists and the only constitutional limitation on the exer-
cise of jurisdiction is the national contacts test of the fifth
amendment. 2 4 Jurisdiction could be constitutionally asserted
in such a case even if the state court could not exercise juris-
diction under its own statutes or under the fourteenth amend-
ment.225  On the other hand, if service can only be made
outside the state, the question of statutory jurisdiction and due
process becomes more complicated.
Rule 4(e) provides for two possible methods of service,
and thus a statutory exercise of jurisdiction, beyond the bor-
ders of the state in which the federal district court sits. The
first possibility is where such service is authorized by a special
statute of the United States. It is generally agreed by the
courts that if Congress has passed a special service of process
statute that extends beyond the borders of the state, and if de-
fendant is within the territorial reach of such statute, then the
statutory jurisdiction problem is solved and the only constitu-
tional question is whether national contacts are satisfied.226
With respect to antitrust actions, as previously discussed, 27
section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for service beyond the
borders of the state in which the federal court sits. The situa-
tions to which the section 12 service provisions can apply is a
question of some doubt. 228 It is clear, however, that if service is
224. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text; see also William B. May Co. v.
Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Rule 4(c) service by mail provisions are not
applicable beyond the state line, and cannot be used to invoke personal jurisdiction
beyond such boundaries); see also Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d
280 (3d Cir.) (Hague Convention does not provide a jurisdictional basis for extrater-
ritorial service), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
225. See Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 928 (1982).
226. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 383 (1985); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.
1981); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); R.
CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.06[5].
227. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text; see also Soltex Polymer Corp.
v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Congress authorizes na-
tionwide service of process in civil RICO actions).
228. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
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authorized by section 12, the only constitutional limitations on
personal jurisdiction are those provided by the national con-
tacts test of the fifth amendment. 2 9
The second possibility for out-of-state service provided by
Rule 4(e) is where a statute of the state in which the district
court sits provides for service "upon a party not an inhabitant
of or found within the state." Rule 4(e) thus incorporates the
long-arm statute of the state in which the district court sits.
There are two problems with this incorporation: 1) some long-
arm statutes are not as extensive as even the fourteenth
amendment would allow;2 30 and 2) even if the statute extended
to the bounds of "due process,"'2'1 the relevant due process
clause as to state authority is the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The question then is whether the fed-
eral court can use the state statutory authority incorporated
into Rule 4(e) as a springboard to asserting jurisdiction over
any defendant with national contacts, or whether the court-
even in a federal question case-is limited strictly to the extra-
territorial authority that the correlative state court would have.
Under the terms of Rule 4(e), the extent to which the fed-
eral court is statutorily authorized to assert jurisdiction, even
in federal question cases, is limited by the extent of extraterri-
torial process authorized by the state long-arm statute. 232 As a
229. Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977); General Elec. Co.
v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Several cases which reject
the national contacts approach in antitrust cases do so on the assumption that there
is no federal statutory basis ofjurisdiction. These courts do not mention section 12,
and have obviously overlooked the statutory authority clearly provided by Congress.
See, e.g., Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
230. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw & RULES § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1986); see Banco Am-
brosiano, S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 432, 476
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15
N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965). How-
ever, many state long-arm statutes are either written to be or construed to be coex-
tensive with due process. See generally R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.01; supra note 25
and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., CALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
232. See Note, supra note 201. In the absence of a special federal statute the only
time the long-arm statutory limitations would be irrelevant is when service is made
inside the state under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (d). Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982).
Of course, use of a limited long-arm statute means that the territorial authority
of a federal court in an antitrust action (if section 12 is inapplicable) is controlled by a
state legislature without federal policy in mind. This is anomalous, but it is a conse-
quence of Rule 4(e), and any cries of federal "policy" are presumably answered by
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result, an intriguing and pervasive question is, presuming that
the state long-arm provides statutory authority, what is the rel-
evant constitutional control in federal court on the statutory
assertion of jurisdiction? Is it the fourteenth amendment
which requires minimum contacts with the state in which the
district court sits, replete with sovereignty limitations? Or is it
the fifth amendment, which requires only minimum contacts
with the United States, which is automatically satisfied as to
resident and domiciliaries of the United States; and which im-
poses no limits resulting from federalism?
A few courts have argued that since the fourteenth amend-
ment is not by its terms applicable to a federal court, only the
fifth amendment is applicable. Thus, these courts hold that
when a state provides statutory authority under its long-arm
statute, Rule 4(e) is merely borrowing that statute to provide a
federal basis for personal jurisdiction; the constitutionality of
such jurisdiction must thus be evaluated under the fifth
amendment national contacts standard.233 This result is some-
what anomalous in that the federal court, using the state stat-
ute, could reach defendants that the state legislature itself
could not constitutionally reach; the long-arm statute is being
used in a manner that the body which made it could not au-
thorize. Yet the result is clearly a favorable one in terms of
effectuating federal interests especially with respect to enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.
The vast majority of courts, however, have held that when
a long-arm statute is borrowed under Rule 4(e) for a statutory
basis ofjurisdiction, the federal court is subject to all the juris-
dictional limitations to which the state court is subject.2 34 This
Congressional inaction in amending Rule 4 to provide for extraterritorial service. See
Note, supra note 201.
233. Handley v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984); Cry-
omedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975); Holt v. Klosters
Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Engineered Sports Products v.
Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973); Centronics Data Computer Corp.
v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1972).
234. See, e.g., George v. Omni Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
383 (1986); Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir.
1984); Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); DeJames v. Magnif-
icence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981);
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuttl Wine Distributors Pty., Ltd., 647 F.2d
200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (federal court in trademark action subject to District of Colum-
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is because Rule 4(e) incorporates the state long-arm statute
with the proviso that service can only be made "under the cir-
cumstances and in the manner" prescribed in the long-arm
statute. The language "under the circumstances" is construed
to mean all the circumstances to which the state legislature
(and thus the state court) is subject, and that includes the limi-
tations of the fourteenth amendment.23 5
It is important to note that these courts do not contend
that the fourteenth amendment applies to the federal court as
a constitutional matter. Rather, these are statutory decisions.
As a statutory matter, Rule 4(e) requires reference to all limita-
tions to which a state court is subject, including the fourteenth
amendment. Rule 4(e) is thus construed, in the absence of a
special federal statute, to make the federal and state courts ju-
risdictionally coextensive; and since the state court would be
prohibited from reaching a defendant on the basis of national
contacts, Rule 4(e) correspondingly prohibits the federal court
from doing SO. 2 3 6  Under this reasoning, the federal court
which resorts to a long-arm statute can only assert jurisdiction
as a statutory matter if the defendant has minimum contacts
with the state in which the federal court sits.2 37 This result is
just as anomalous as the minority viewpoint because under the
majority view, a constitutional provision which by its terms
does not apply nonetheless effectively limits a federal court's
jurisdiction.
In sum, the national contacts test, an important tool in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws, is available (other than in
bia long-arm statute); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406
(9th Cir. 1977); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
235. Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); Dejames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
236. In Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981);Judge Gibbons, dissenting, argued that a state court itself
is not bound by the fourteenth amendment in a federal question case, but is subject
only to the fifth amendment due process clause. Thus, even though FED. R. Civ. P.
4(e) incorporates all the "circumstances" to which the state court is subject, in fed-
eral question cases, those "circumstances" would be the limitations of the fifth
amendment, not the fourteenth amendment. This analysis is quite cogent, and solves
the dilemma of a federal court being indirectly subject to the fourteenth amendment;
it has not yet, however, been adopted by a majority of any court. See Weinberg, supra
note 83, at 936-38.
237. See Lilly, supra note 23; Note, supra note 27.
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the relatively limited cases of in-state service) 238 only when a
federal statute authorizes extraterritorial service of process. In
antitrust cases, it is thus of the utmost importance to deter-
mine when section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for out-of-
state service over the defendant.2 3 9 It is also important for the
courts to construe the service provisions of section 12 to apply
in the optimum number of cases. Otherwise an antitrust plain-
tiff is left to the vagaries of state law and indirectly to a consti-
tutional provision grounded in sovereignty limitations which
should be inapplicable to the federal court.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process is both a formal jurisdictional act and a
means for notifying the defendant of the action. Even if the
defendant is otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction, plaintiff
must satisfy the notice aspects of service of process. Both con-
stitutional and statutory requirements must thus be met as to
the manner of service.
The defendant has a constitutional procedural due pro-
cess right defined in the landmark case of Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. as "notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise [defendants] of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to be
heard. ' ' 240 The Mullane test of reasonableness allows a flexible
balancing approach which takes account of the expenses of no-
tifying defendants. Under Mullane, actual personal in-hand
service is not constitutionally required if other substituted ser-
vice is as likely to reach defendants; the test is whether a per-
son who desired to notify defendant would use such a method of
service.2 4 ' In essence, the statutory requirements of manner of
service under Federal Rule 4 are written with Mullane in
mind. 2
4 2
Besides satisfying procedural due process, plaintiff must
satisfy the statutory requirements as to manner of service
238. See supra notes 68-72.
239. See supra notes 35-51.
240. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
241. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(upholding mailed service); see also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); R. CASAD,
supra note 26, at 2.03[2][b].
242. See generally 2J. MOORE, supra note 124, ch. 4.
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under Federal Rule 4.248 Actual notice is both unnecessary and
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional and statutory require-
ments as to manner of service.244
Analysis of the statutory requirements as to manner of ser-
vice begins with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In an international antitrust action, Federal Rule 4 governs
manner of service even where the formal act of asserting statu-
tory jurisdiction is provided by section 12 of the Clayton Act.
Section 12 does not provide any requirements as to manner of
service. In such a situation, Rule 4(e) provides that if there is
no federal statute "prescribing the manner of service," service
is to be made in a manner prescribed by Rule 4.245
Rule 4 provides for, among other things, personal service
upon a corporation or partnership by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint to an officer thereof, or to "any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service
of process.1 246 Appointment of such an "agent" could be re-
quired by law in order for the corporation or partnership to be
authorized to do business in a certain state.247 More impor-
tantly, courts have deemed corporate affiliates of a non-resi-
dent defendant to be appropriate agents for service where de-
fendant exercises effective control over the affiliate. 248 It will
243. Failure to properly serve process results in dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction
because any resulting judgment would be void. Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg.
Systems, Inc., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984).
244. Id. (statutory requirements); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (constitutional requirements); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S.
13 (1928); Daley v. ALIA, 105 F.R.D. 87, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (actual notice insuffi-
cient where extraterritorial service unauthorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4); FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(1).
245. See Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
246. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
247. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw. § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
248. See Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (West
German parent corporation's control over wholly-owned American subsidiary suffi-
cient basis for finding that parent transacted business in Florida and that subsidiary
acted as parent's agent; service on subsidiary is deemed service on parent); Industria
Siciliana Asfalti v. Exxon Research and Eng'g., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,256
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (jurisdiction over foreign subsidiary found upon activities of a
United States parent on grounds that parent was acting on behalf of subsidiary,
though less of a control than would be required to find a common law agency); Sun-
rise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,092 (S.D.N.Y
1972); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 40, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n, 1946-47
Trade Cas. (CCH) 57,508 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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be particularly important to establish such an agency within
the state in which the federal court sits if there is no federal
statute (e.g., section 12 of the Clayton Act) which establishes
extraterritorial jurisdiction in a particular case. 249  Federal
Rule 4 will control intra-state service, thus triggering the fifth
amendment national contacts test, rather than the stricter four-
teenth amendment test which is applicable when a state long-
arm statute is used for extraterritorial service.250 In other
words, with an intra-state agent or affiliate of an out-of-state
defendant, the issues of jurisdiction and service are inter-
twined.25'
Besides personal service, Federal Rule 4 now provides for
service by mail on an appropriate deliveree. The requirements
of proper mailed service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) are specific
and detailed, and must be strictly followed.252 The summons
and complaint must be served by first class mail with an ac-
knowledgment form conforming to form 18-A of the Federal
Rules.253 The acknowledgement of service must be-returned
within 20 days of mailing. If there is no return within that
time, the only valid manner of service then becomes personal
service on defendant or an agent: plaintiff cannot reattempt
service by mail, nor can plaintiff use a substitute service pro-
vided by state law, as would otherwise be allowed under Rule
4(c) (2) (C) (i). 254 Plaintiff does, however, receive some comfort
from Rule 4(c)(2)(D) which provides that defendant shall pay
for the costs of personal service unless it can show good cause
for not returning the receipt within 20 days of mailing.
If service is outside the state in which the federal court
sits, the mailing provisions of Rule 4(c) do not apply unless a
249. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 200-39 and accompanying text.
251. While this is true as a federal statutory matter due to the limits of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, it may not always be true in terms of countable contacts
for the minimum contacts test of due process. Contacts of an agent can be attributed
to a defendant even though the agent is completely separate as a corporate matter.
Yet such an agent for minimum contacts purposes will generally not be an agent for
purposes of service under Rule 4. See R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.03[s], 5.01[2];
supra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
252. Delta Steamships Lines, Inc. v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1985).
253. The acknowledgment serves as proof of service. See Delta Steamships
Lines v. Albano, 768 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1985).
254. Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems, Inc., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th
Cir. 1984).
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federal statute authorizes such extraterritorial service to be
made, at which point Rule 4(c) would govern as to manner of
service.255 If a federal statute is not applicable, Rule 4(e) relies
on the state long-arm statute for statutory jurisdiction. 256  If
plaintiff resorts to state law for statutory jurisdiction, the ap-
propriate manner of all service effected within the United
States is governed solely by the service of process provisions of
the state in which the district court sits.2 5 7 In contrast, if statu-
tory jurisdiction is provided by a federal statute, Rules 4(c) and
(e) state that plaintiff has the option to follow either Rule 4 or
the forum state's process provisions to satisfy the requirement
of a proper manner of service.258 In either case, reference
must be made to the particular service of process provision of
the state in which the district court sits. Service provisions vary
among the states.259
When service must be made outside the United States in
order to obtain personal jurisdiction, the requirements as to
manner of service are somewhat more complicated. Again,
without a special federal statute authorizing service, the provi-
sions on manner of service in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) and Rule 4(d)
are inapplicable. 260 However, where statutory jurisdiction ex-
ists-either by the long-arm statute, in which state rules on ser-
vice apply, or by a federal statute like section 12 of the Clayton
255. See Daley v. ALIA, 105 F.R.D. 87, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); William B. May Co.
v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In fact, none of the rules as to manner of
service provided by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c) or 4(d) apply extraterritorially in the absence
of a federal statutory grant of personal jurisdiction. Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907
(2d Cir. 1983).
256. See supra notes 222-37 and accompanying text.
257. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), 4(c)(2)(C)(i); Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d (2d Cir. 1983);
Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
258. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i); see Delta Steamships Lines, Inc. v. Albano, 768
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1985). Where section 12 of the Clayton Act authorizes statutory
jurisdiction, and state service provisions are borrowed under FED. R. Civ. P.
4(c)(2)(C)(i), the constitutional limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction are those
provided by the national contacts test of the fifth amendment. This is because a fed-
eral statutory grant ofjurisdiction exists, and FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) borrows state pro-
cedures only as to the manner of service-not as to the manner and circumstances of
service, which are borrowed where a federal jurisdiction statute is not applicable. See
Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); Terry v. Raymond Int'l,
Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982).
259. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 308 (McKinney Supp. 1986) with
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 410.10 (West Supp. 1982).
260. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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Act, 26 1 in which the service provisions of both Rule 4(c)-(d)
and the forum state are applicable-Rule 4(i) of the Federal
Rules provides additional options to a plaintiff seeking a
proper manner of service.262
Rule 4(i) allows service, in addition to previously dis-
cussed means, by any of five different means. First, service
may be effected in the manner provided by the country where
service is made. This would include manners of substituted
service not acceptable under either Rule 4(c)-(d) or the forum
state service provisions.26 3 Service may also be made through
letters rogatory. Such service proceeds through diplomatic
channels and is often quite time consuming. 264
Personal service on defendant or, if a corporation, upon
an officer, a managing agent, or a general agent is authorized
by Rule 4(i). Service by mail, requiring a signed receipt, is au-
thorized by Rule 4(i). Such service must be mailed by the clerk
of the court. Finally, Rule 4(i) also provides for service pursu-
ant to court order, in any manner or circumstances not already
authorized by Rule 4(c) or (d) (if applicable) or by the state
service provisions, so long as the service is reasonable and ade-
quate under the circumstances in attempting to notify the de-
fendant. 265
Courts have generally required plaintiff to exhaust or
demonstrate the futility of the other methods allowed by Rule
4(i) before resorting to court-ordered service.266 However, if
such methods are shown wanting, the courts have shown a will-
ingness to authorize novel and flexible methods of serving de-
261. It should be remembered that some courts have held that section 12 does
not authorize service outside the United States. See supra notes 48-51 and accompa-
nying text.
262. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i), by its terms, governs only manner of service. Thus, for
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) provisions to apply, a statutory grant of worldwide service must
be found under a federal statute or the long-arm statute of the forum state. See R.
CASAD, supra note 26, at 4.06[4].
263. United States v. Danenza, 528 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1975). The option of
complying with the service provisions of the state in which the service is made is not
available for service within the United States. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), 4(d); see also Davis
v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1983).
264. A description of the letters rogatory process can be found in R. CASAD,
supra note 26, at 4.06[l].
265. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
266. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmis-
sion Co., 508 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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fendant.267
In addition to Rule 4(i), further methods of service may be
authorized by international treaties to which the United States
is a signatory, such as the Convention on Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention or
Convention) .268 The Hague Convention deals solely with
manner of service and is not a grant of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.269 While the Hague Convention is a self-
executing law authorizing an appropriate manner of service in
a signatory country, 270 Rule 4(i) does not specifically provide
that service under the Hague Convention is valid. The advi-
sory committee has, however, proposed an amendment to
Rule 4(i) which would specifically authorize service pursuant to
applicable treaties or conventions in addition to the methods
authorized by Rule 4(i). 2 7 ' The contrary proposition is also
true: Rule 4 provisions for service (including Rule 4(i)) are or-
dinarily additional methods by which a defendant can be served
in a country that is party to the Hague Convention unless
otherwise indicated; the Hague Convention does not ordina-
rily pre-empt the service provisions of Rule 4.272
The Hague Convention provides that certain methods of
267. See, e.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175-82 (2d
Cir.) (service pursuant to court order held valid where plaintiff's attorney threw pro-
cess onto the grounds of defendant's residence and fled pursuing bodyguards and
also mailed process), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 508 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (service by telex).
268. Convention on the Service ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, entered into force for the United States, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter cited as the Hague Convention]. The
text of the Hague Convention is reproduced in full at 28 U.S.C.A., following FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(i) (West Supp. 1986). The parties to the Hague Convention are: Barbados,
Belgium, Botswana, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Seychelles, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and West Ger-
many.
269. See Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.) (Hague
Convention is not a "wholly federal means" of service triggering the national con-
tacts test), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
270. See Voorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
271. See Preliminary Draft, published by Committee on Rules of Practice and of
the Judicial Conference, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.
272. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1085 (1981); International Control Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1979); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
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service be made through the "central authority" of the receiv-
ing country. 73 First, service may be in the manner of the
country where made.274 Second, service may be made by any
method requested by the applicant pursuant to a request form
filed with the central authority of the receiving state. The form
of service requested must not violate local law, as determined
by the central authority.2 75
In addition to the service methods provided through the
central authority, article 10 of the Convention provides for
personal service by competent officials of the rendering state,
and also that service can be made directly by ordinary mail.
This mailing provision is, on its face, compatible with the mail-
ing provisions of Rule 4(i)(1)(D) and Rule 4(c). However, arti-
cle 10 mailed service is allowed only if the "state of destination
does not object." Several countries, most notably West Ger-
many, have objected to mailed service.276 Moreover, various
signatory countries have objected to, or imposed conditions
upon, certain other methods of service otherwise allowed by
the Convention or by Rule 4. For instance, West Germany, as
well as other nations, has ratified the Treaty subject to the con-
dition that process be translated.277 Japan objected to the per-
sonal service provisions of article 10.278 Such reservations os-
tensibly limit the possible methods of service that can be made
pursuant to the Convention within the objecting country. A
more difficult question is whether such reservations would pro-
hibit service otherwise permissible under Rule 4. Is the Con-
vention merely supplementary to Rule 4, or does it pre-empt
273. Hague Convention, supra note 268, at art. 2. A list of central authorities may
be obtained from the Justice Department or United States Marshals.
274. Hague Convention, supra note 268, at art. 5(a). Ordinarily, translation of doc-
uments is required. See 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1986), following FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)
(ratifications following the treaty) (Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden). Even without
regard to the Hague Convention, translation may be required to satisfy the rudimentary
concepts of notice. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
275. Hague Convention, supra note 268, at art. 5(b). The request must be submit-
ted pursuant to a request form, which may be found following the text of the Con-
vention at 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1986), following FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
276. Harris v. Browning-Ferris Chemical Services, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D.
La. 1984); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., 88 A.D.2d 504, 449 N.Y.S.2d
733 (1st Dep't 1982).
277. See 28 U.S.C.A., following FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (West Supp. 1986) (ratifica-
tions of Treaty); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
278. Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1980).
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Rule 4, at least insofar as it prohibits service otherwise permissi-
ble under Rule 4 or the incorporated state service provisions?
The courts that have considered the question have thus far
uniformly held that, use of Rule 4 methods of service, includ-
ing, by absorption, the forum state service provisions, is invalid
where such use is otherwise prohibited by the Hague Conven-
tion.2 7 9 Since service of process is void in such cases, nojudg-
ment can properly be rendered. Thus, a violation of the
Hague Convention concomitantly results in a judgment that is
void abroad as well as within the United States.280 The cases
finding Hague Convention prohibitions pre-emptive of Rule 4
are generally based on the rationale that the Hague Conven-
tion was adopted after Rule 4, that a self-executing treaty like
the Hague Convention is of equal dignity with an Act of Con-
gress, and that "where the two conflict, the latter in time
prevails. ' '28' This rationale may cut the other way in light of
the recent adoption of the mailed service provisions of Rule
4(c), and in light of the proposed amendment to Rule 4(i)
which states that the Convention is an alternative to, and not
pre-emptive of, the other Rule 4 service provisions. Applica-
tion of the last in time rule to the new Rule 4 provisions could
very well mean the mailed service provisions of Rule 4(c), as
well as all provisions of Rule 4(i), supersede any prior-in-time
Convention prohibition.28 2
Even presuming, however, that Rule 4 provisions would
be respected by United States courts as controlling service provi-
sions-thus resulting in a judgment enforceable in the United
States-if service is invalid under the law of the defendant's
country or pursuant to a Hague Convention prohibition, plain-
tiff will not be able to enforce the judgment in such country.
For instance, Switzerland will refuse to enforce a judgment as
to which service was made in Switzerland by mail; in fact Swit-
279. See Voorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff
allowed to re-serve defendant in accordance with the Convention; the court refused
to dismiss the complaints because the statute of limitations had run); Harris v.
Browning-Ferris Chemical Servs., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D. La. 1984); Kadota v.
Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1980); Low v. Bayerische Motoren
Werke A.G., 88 A.D.2d 504, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1st Dep't 1982).
280. Voorhees, 697 F.2d at 576.
281. Id. at 575-76.
282. See generally Note, A Practical Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14
INT'L LAw. 637, 640-42 (1980).
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zerland refuses to recognize any manner of service other than
letters rogatory. 283 The intra-territorial prohibitions of foreign
states (other than those reserved in the Hague Convention) or-
dinarily do not prohibit the rendering and enforcement of a
judgment in the United States. 284 Such prohibitions will obvi-
ously preclude enforcement of the judgment in the country
which objects to the manner of service. Care must accordingly
be taken, and local counsel should be consulted at the time of
service, if the judgment must ultimately be enforced outside
the United States.
All the complicated problems of service abroad can be by-
passed if service can be effectuated upon an agent of the for-
eign defendant in the United States. This includes the secre-
tary of state of the forum state if the defendant is authorized to
do business within the forum.285 More importantly, it includes
affiliated corporations actually controlled by the foreign de-
fendant. 286
III. VENUE
Venue and jurisdiction are distinct requirements which
must be analyzed separately. Jurisdiction concerns the power
of the court to assert authority over the defendant and to sub-
ject it to the burdens of distant litigation; venue is concerned
with a forum location which will guarantee trial conven-
ience.287  Nonetheless, in antitrust actions-especially where
283. Id.
284. Id. But see FTC v. Compagnie de Saint Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300, 1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in dictum, the court states that in the United States,
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) provisions may violate international law, thus resulting in unen-
forceability).
285. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 307 (McKinney Supp. 1986); FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(d)(3).
286. See supra notes 120-31; Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.
Fla. 1985) (control exercised by West German parent corporation over wholly owned
American subsidiary sufficient basis for finding agency for service of process; objec-
tion of West Germany to mailed service under article 10 of Hague Convention inap-
plicable when service was accomplished upon alter ego within United States); Zisman
v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (service on local agent of foreign defend-
ant; limitations of Hague Convention inapplicable when service accomplished within
United States).
287. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Myers v. Amer-
ican Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 724 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106
(1983); Buckeye Assocs., Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (D. Mass.
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statutory jurisdiction is sought under section 12 of the Clayton
Act-the issues of venue and jurisdiction tend to intertwine.
In antitrust actions, special antitrust venue provisions as
well as the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (sec-
tion 1391) are applicable. 8 8 In international antitrust cases
where alien defendants are concerned, the venue question is as
easy as an original matter: 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (section
1391(d)) provides that an alien may be sued in any district.289
The question thus arises: Why, in an international antitrust
case, does the plaintiff ordinarily seek to show that the defend-
ant transacts business in the judicial district so as to satisfy the
much more complicated venue provision of section 12 of the
Clayton Act? 290 The answer lies in the fact that many courts
have conditioned the use of the section 12 statutory grant of
worldwide personal jurisdiction 29' upon satisfaction of the sec-
tion 12 venue requirements.292 In these courts, the use of the
simpler venue provision of section 1391(d) is costly in that
plaintiff must find statutory jurisdiction under the forum state
long-arm statute which in turn is limited by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause through Federal Rule 4(e). On
the other hand, if plaintiff pays the cost of proving venue
under the more difficult transacting business test of section 12,
the federal statutory grant automatically gives personal juris-
diction over the alien, 293 and the only constitutional limitation
1985) ("because venue is primarily a matter of convenience of litigants and witnesses
... it should be distinguished from personal jurisdiction").
288. See Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706 (1972); King
v. Johnson Wax Assoc., 565 F. Supp. 711 (D. Md. 1983) (§ 1391(b)); Bamford v.
Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 169-70 (S.D. Tex. 1983); General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Man-
nesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 661 (D.N.H. 1977); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa
Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
289. See Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706 (1972);
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,824 (D.D.C. 1984) (venue in any district proper as to Canadian corporate defend-
ant); General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
290. See, e.g., Buckeye Assocs., Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D.
Mass. 1985).
291. Some courts construe section 12 to provideor nationwide, not worldwide,
service of process. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
292. Buckeye Assocs., Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Mass.
1985). For the better view, that the section 12 service provision is independent from
the venue provision, see supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
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is the fifth amendment national contacts test.29 4 Also, if de-
fendant is not an alien (which can obviously be the case even in
an international antitrust case) the transacts business test of
section 12 will ordinarily be the most liberal venue provision
open to plaintiff.295 Accordingly, the venue provisions of sec-
tion 12 are of prime consideration in an antitrust case.
Section 12 applies only to corporate defendants; it provides
for venue in any judicial district where such defendant is an
"inhabitant, is found, or transacts business." If defendant is
not a corporation, venue must be found either under the more
restrictive provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act, or under
the general venue provisions.
A corporate defendant is an "inhabitant" of the state or
country where it is incorporated. 296 Thus, an alien corporation
by definition is not an "inhabitant" of any judicial district. A
corporate defendant is "found" wherever it would be consid-
ered to be "present" or "doing business" under the traditional
jurisdictional tests applicable after Pennoyer v. Neff. 29 7 This re-
quires a showing of substantial and continuous activity within
the district tantamount to a finding of permanence. 298  Most
courts have held that an alien corporation cannot be "found"
in a district where it does business through subsidiaries or
other distributors; a corporation must ordinarily have its own
agents and officers present in the district. 299
In 1914 Congress added the phrase "transacts business"
294. See supra notes 200-39 and accompanying text.
295. Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 514-15.
296. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Automobile Body Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400 (1st Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966).
297. 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
246 U.S. 79, 84 (1918); supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
298. See Johnson Creative Arts v. Wool Masters, 743 F.2d 947, 952-54 (lst Cir.
1984) (same test applied to "doing business" under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c)); Pacific Car
and Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1968) (office, employee, or agent
within the district, carrying on continuous activity); Philadephia Hous. Auth. v. Amer-
ican Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (cor-
poration is found in district if license would be required as condition precedent to
conducting such activity).
299. Stern Fish Co. v. Century Seafoods, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 151, 153 (E.D. Pa.
1966). This strict requirement for venue does not necessarily apply to the statutory
grant ofjurisdiction provided by section 12. At least where the defendant exercises
substantial control over a local affiliate, service of process on the affiliate is consid-
ered a proper statutory exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. See supra notes
120-31.
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to section 12 as an additional location in which venue would be
proper as to corporate defendants in antitrust cases. The in-
tent of Congress was to broaden plaintiff's venue options since
the term "found" often resulted in plaintiff's inability to sue
conveniently, or even to sue at all in the United States. 0 0
Thus, the Supreme Court has instructed that the phrase
"transacts business" should be given a liberal construction
based on "practical business conceptions" instead of "the pre-
vious hair-splitting legal technicalities encrusted upon the
'found' - 'present' - 'carrying-on-business' sequence" of sec-
tion 12.301 A broad construction makes sense since any other
construction raises unreasonable obstacles to the enforcement
of United States antitrust laws.
The general test for transacting business, according to the
Supreme Court, is whether the defendant carries on business
of a substantial character within the district as evaluated by
practical everyday business concepts.30 2 Given the broad con-
struction encouraged by the Supreme Court in Scophony it is
fair to say, however, that the response of the lower courts has
often been disappointing. Cases can be found which construe
the term "transacts business" very strictly, ignoring the obvi-
ous impact that the defendant has within the district and the
obvious benefits it derives therefrom.3 0 3 In fact, there are
many cases which construe the transacts business requirement
more strictly than the personal jurisdiction due process re-
quirements, especially in cases where the cause of action is re-
lated to defendant's contacts with the forum. 04 Yet for every
300. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 374
(1927).
301. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 808 (1948).
302. Id. at 807.
303. See, e.g., O.S.C. v. Toshiba, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974) (contacts of
wholly owned importer and distributor selling products solely on behalf of defendant
are not attributable to defendant); Sportmart, Inc. & Olympic Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch,
537 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (foreign defendant does not transact business
through wholly owned United States subsidiary which is the exclusive domestic dis-
tributor of defendant's products, with substantial sales within the district); Williams
v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (parent company does not transact
business within forum through wholly owned subsidiary even though there are inter-
locking directorates, common officers, transfer of personnel, and basic decisions on
marketing procedures made by parent).
304. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text; see also Buckeye Assocs., Ltd.
v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Mass. 1985); Sportmart, Inc. & Olympic
Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Cascade Steel Rolling
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case which unreasonably construes "transacts business"
strictly, there is a case which has taken Scophony to heart and
adopted a broad view under which venue is at least as easy to
find as countable, minimum contacts with the forum state.3 0 5
It is safe to conclude from the foregoing that it is some-
what unpredictable whether a defendant will be found to trans-
act business under section 12. It will depend, of course, on the
particular facts of each case,3 0 6 and on whether the court takes
a properly broad or an unreasonably narrow view of what con-
stitutes transacting business. Nonetheless, a few generalities
can be drawn to help evaluate a given set of facts. First, it is
well accepted that the activities which constitute transacting
business need not be related to the cause of action under sec-
tion 12.307 It is also well accepted that the court is not to view
Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 499 F. Supp. 829 (D. Or. 1980) (stream of commerce
contacts ignored for transacting business under section 12, although the same con-
tacts would be purposeful and countable for minimum contacts purposes); Athlete's
Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 35 (D. Del. 1977) (agree-
ment with franchisee does not constitute transacting business, even though it is
clearly purposeful availment under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, 105
S. Ct. 2174 (1985)).
305. See Myers v. American Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 726-27 (3d Cir. 1982)
(isolated entry into district to promulgate local standards found to constitute trans-
acting business; venue requirements should not be more strictly construed than per-
sonal jurisdiction requirements); Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of
Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (purchasing activity by agents in district
constitutes transacting business); Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping
Auth., 442 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (transacting business found through an
agency, even though an independent entity, in accord with agency theory of pur-
poseful availment); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., 402 F.
Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
306. See Myers, 695 F.2d at 726-28 ("transacts business" analysis requires a case
by case approach).
307. Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616
(E.D. Mich. 1985). Since transacting business requires less pervasive contacts than
the substantial contacts required for general jurisdiction (such contacts are synony-
mous with the "found-presence" test of venue), it is at least theoretically possible
that venue would be permissible under section 12, but personal jurisdiction would
not exist. This could occur when defendant transacts business, the cause of action is
unrelated to such business, and the contacts do not rise to the level required for
general jurisdiction. The reason this problem will not often, if ever, arise is because
if defendant is found to transact business under section 12, that will trigger world-
wide statutory jurisdiction. But see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. As to
United States corporations, jurisdiction would be automatic. As to aliens, defend-
ant's contacts throughout the United States would be aggregated. Since it is already
assumed that defendant transacts business in a single judicial district, it will be the
rare case where there are not enough contacts elsewhere which, when added to those
in the forum district, will not then be sufficient to support general jurisdiction.
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the defendant's intra-district business in comparison with the
defendant's total business.3 8 A view to the contrary would
suggest that a defendant who spread its business equally
throughout the United States would not be transacting busi-
ness anywhere.
The volume of business is to be evaluated from the point
of view of the average businessman, not froin the perspective
of a major corporation. 30 9 Thus, even a few thousand dollars'
worth of continuous business a year may be sufficient "trans-
acting" for a court which takes a broad view of section 12.310
Furthermore, transacting can be found through either
purchasing activity or sales activity within the district, or
both.3 1 '
Other intra-district forms of business which are relevant to
"transacting" include maintenance of local offices or employ-
ees, 3 12 visits to the district by officers, employees or sales rep-
resentatives, 3 13 patent licensing activities, 3 4 negotiation or
308. Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977); Dunham's, 614 F.
Supp. at 624; In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
309. Black v. Acme Mkts, Inc., 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977); Dunham's, 614 F.
Supp. at 624; In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
310. Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616
(E.D. Mich. 1985); ABC Great Sales, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 310 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.
Il1. 1970) ($14,500 in sales found sufficient). But see King v. Johnson Wax Assoc.,
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711 (D. Md. 1983) ($2,000 per year would not be considered sub-
stantial enough to be transacting business from point of view of average business-
man).
311. See Dunham's, Inc. v. National Buying Syndicate of Texas, 614 F. Supp. 616
(E.D. Mich. 1985); Black v. Acme Mkts., 564 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1977). Purchasing
activity will not count significantly toward a finding of general jurisdiction for mini-
mum contacts purposes, though it is significant for specific jurisdiction. See supra
notes 101, 142-56 and accompanying text. Thus, where the cause of action is unre-
lated to the contacts, purchasing activity may lead to a finding of venue without juris-
diction. Again this anomaly is more theoretical than real, given the fact that a finding
of transacting business triggers nationwide or worldwide jurisdiction and a national
contacts test of due process. See supra note 307.
It must be emphasized that the relevant geographical area for determining trans-
action of business is the judicial district. In states with more than one judicial district,
the fourteenth amendment requirement of minimum contacts with the state-wher-
ever applicable-will result in a broader analysis for jurisdiction than for venue.
312. See, e.g., Professional Adjusting Sys. of Am., Inc. v. General Adjustment Bu-
reau, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Gray Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sightseeing
Companies Associated, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (local office main-
tained for sales purposes); Friedman v. United States Trunk Co., 204 F. Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 367 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1966).
313. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1006
(E.D. Pa. 1967) (court found venue relying in large part on good will visits to custom-
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consummation of contracts,315 and delivery of products. 16
Advertising which reaches the district may be relevant to the
venue determination, but it will ordinarily not be sufficient in
itself to be transacting business.3" 7
A finding of transacting business is much more likely if the
business is conducted on a relatively continuous and system-
atic basis. 18 On the other hand, even a single transaction
(such as a significant negotiation, contracting, or sale in the
district) has been held sufficient for "transacting" by courts
which have given section 12 a liberal construction." 9 A re-
quirement of substantial continuity for transacting business
will prohibit venue under section 12 in cases where jurisdiction
would exist on the basis of isolated contacts and a related
cause of action. 2 ° While venue and jurisdiction are distinct
concepts, it makes little sense to construe section 12 more
strictly than the already strict limitations imposed by the
Supreme Court's jurisdictional requirement of purposeful
ers and advertising and mail order catalogues used in the district); Rhode Island Fit-
tings Co. v. Grinnell Corp., 215 F. Supp. 198 (D.R.I. 1963) (sales representative sent
to Rhode Island seven times a year and sales volume of $108,000 annually in Rhode
Island led court to find venue).
314. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Diebold, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,827 (D. Del.
1977); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
316. Compare, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir.
1974) (no venue where delivery made in Japan from Japanese parent to United States
subsidiary and which in turn were imported into the district) with Sunbury Wire Rope
Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 129 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (venue found
where delivery into district even though title passed in a different state).
317. See King v. Johnson Wax Assocs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711, 717 (D. Md.
1983); Athlete's Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 35 (D.
Del. 1977).
318. See B. J. Semel Assocs. v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827, 832
(D.C. Cir. 1966); King v. Johnson Wax Assocs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711, 716 (D. Md.
1983) ("[A] corporation's contacts with a district must be somewhat regular and con-
tinuous; meager, sporadic dealings within the district are not sufficient."); Amateur-
Wholesale Elecs. v. R.L. Drake Co., 515 F. Supp. 580, 585 (S.D. Fla. 1981) ("The
business transacted must be of a substantial character, and it must have some degree
of continuity;" use of two trade shows to display products in district in last two years
"is not sufficient to constitute the requisite degree of continuous local contact").
319. See Myers v. American Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1982); Hoffman
Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
320. See, e.g., El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 444 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (court finds jurisdiction under state long-arm statute on the basis of meetings
conducted in New York; court states that more is required for venue under section
12).
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availment. Such an unreasoned limitation on section 12 is con-
trary to the broad construction mandated by Scophony.
There is disagreement among the courts as to whether the
"transacts business" test is determined as of the time the cause
of action arose, or rather as of the time the complaint is filed.
The question can be of obvious import where defendant has
ceased transacting business in the judicial district after the an-
titrust injury. Courts which hold the date of filing as the rele-
vant date have reasoned that the statutory phrase "transacts
business" is written in the present tense, not in the past.3 2'
Courts which hold the accrual date the relevant point for ascer-
taining venue have done so to prevent corporations from com-
mitting antitrust violations and then fleeing the district.3 22 In
light of these competing considerations, some courts have
taken the compromise position that the date of accrual is the
relevant date if the plaintiff's claim is related to business trans-
acted in the district; otherwise the date of filing is the relevant
date.323
Where there is a claim of a conspiracy to violate the anti-
trust laws with venue obtainable over one co-conspirator,
plaintiffs have asserted a co-conspirator theory of venue. The
argument is that since each co-conspirator is an agent for an-
other, venue over one co-conspirator should constitute venue
over all. The proposition that the presence of a co-conspirator
within the district automatically means that venue is proper as
to all conspirators, has been uniformly rejected.3 24 However,
what if a co-conspirator carries out an antitrust conspiracy by
transacting business within the district? Should venue exist
under section 12 as to all co-conspirators? Some courts have
accepted this "modified" conspiracy theory of venue under
321. Amateur-Wholesale Elecs., v. R.L. Drake Co., 515 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Fla.
1981); C.C.P. Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co., 354 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1973). This rea-
soning is faulty by its terms because if applied strictly it would make the relevant date
that on which the venue determination is made, rather than the date on which the suit
was filed.
322. Snyder v. Eastern Auto Distribs., 357 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 987 (1966); Nelson v. Victory Elec. Works, 210 F. Supp. 954 (D. Md. 1962).
323. See King v. Johnson Wax Assocs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711 (D. Md. 1983).
324. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953) (dictum);
Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1979)
(co-conspirator theory of venue rejected by court which promulgated it); see supra
notes 110-18 and accompanying text (similar view of the co-conspirator theory of
jurisdiction).
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section 12.325 However, a majority of courts have rejected the
conspiracy theory of venue entirely, thus requiring that venue
be shown as to each co-conspirator separately through direct
acts that constitute "transacting business. 3 26 These courts
reason that the co-conspirator theory is faulty because it is
merit-based; it assumes what must be proven in the case.5 27
This argument ignores the fact that many preliminary inquiries
with respect to an appropriate forum are merit-based. Most
importantly, many jurisdictional bases are merit-based, such as
the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction. Any problem with a
merit-based determination is solved by requiring prima facie
proof at the preliminary level. 8 In this way, the preliminary
issue does not assume what must be proved; thus the courts
that reject the conspiracy theory of venue in its entirety ignore
a more reasoned solution to the problem they pose.
The conspiracy theory of venue-at least where a co-con-
spirator transacts business in the district pursuant to the con-
spiracy-is essential to the proper enforcement of the antitrust
laws. If each co-conspirator must be shown to directly transact
business in the district, it is possible that venue may not be
obtainable in any one district over all defendants. 329 The bur-
dens on plaintiff, as well as on those defendants who are trans-
acting business in the district of plaintiff's choice, are obvious
when such a "venue gap" occurs. 3 It is more efficient for a
plaintiff to have a claim heard against all related defendants in
one proceeding; ajudicial construction of section 12 must take
that efficiency into account. This is especially so since Con-
325. Securities Inv. Protector Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir.
1985); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy must rise to level of transacting business;
allegations of district activity insufficient); Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American To-
bacco Co., 338 F. Supp. 842, 844 (D. Or. 1972).
326. Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933 (D.D.C. 1981); Car-
ibe Trailer Sys., Inc. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 475 F. Supp. 711
(D.D.C. 1979); San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 364 F. Supp. 1157,
1159 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974).
327. Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933 (D.D.C. 1981); see
Byrnes, Bringing the Co-Conspiratory Theory of Venue Up-to-Date and into Proper Perspective,
11 ANTITRUST BULL. 889 (1966); Note, supra note 27, at 340 n.44.
328. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text; Hovenkamp, supra note 46,
at 521.
329. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 515-20.
330. Id.; see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981) (no contribution among antitrust defendants).
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468 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:401
gress has shown its intent to close venue gaps in the interest of
judicial economy.33 ' Finally, rejection of a co-conspiracy the-
ory of venue means that in many cases venue requirements will
be harder to satisfy than jurisdictional requirements. This is
contrary to the broad construction of section 12 mandated by
Scophony.
Another theory of transacting business offered by plain-
tiffs is the "target theory." This theory is parallel to the "ef-
fects" test ofjurisdiction 2 The argument is that a defendant
can be held to transact business in a district as long as that
defendant targeted plaintiff's antitrust injury to occur in that
district. This theory of venue is different from the conspiracy
theory; it is based not on overt acts of a co-conspirator in the
district, but rather on targeted effects created by the defendant
in the district whether or not the defendant physically entered
the district. However, as with the conspiracy theory of venue,
most courts have rejected the target theory of section 12 venue
as merit-based.33 Other courts have solved this supposedly
insurmountable problem by requiring prima facie proof of
targeted effects for venue purposes. 3 4 Acceptance of the tar-
get theory is necessary to combat the pervasive nature of anti-
trust injury; it also avoids the anomaly of maintaining stricter
standards of venue than of jurisdiction.
The most controversial and fact-based issue of venue
under section 12 is whether a defendant can be deemed to be
transacting business through a subsidiary or corporate affiliate
which admittedly transacts business within the forum. The
leading case in this area is United States v. Scophony Corp.33 5
Scophony Corporation was a British corporation which
manufactured and sold television apparatus and also owned
and licensed patents on television reception and transmission.
331. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 521; Comment, Federal Venue: Locating the
Place Where the Claim Arose, 54 TEX. L. REV. 392, 399-401 (1976).
332. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Sportmart, Inc. & Olympic Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp.
1254 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933 (D.D.C.
1981); Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., 499 F. Supp. 829 (D. Or.
1980).
334. See, e.g., Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesman, A.G., 432 F.
Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (target theory applied; prima facie proof of conspiracy
shown).
335. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
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After the outbreak of war in 1939, Scophony opened an office
in New York and commenced activities preliminary to the es-
tablishment of an American manufacturing and sales business.
Negotiations, carried on by a director of Scophony (Levey),
were entered into with Paramount and General Precision, both
United States corporations. Agreements were reached which
provided for the establishment of a new corporation (Ameri-
can Scophony), with control shared among all three corpora-
tions.3 3 6 Levey became president and a director of American
Scophony. The agreements provided, among other things,
that Scophony was to transfer all its interests in patents in the
Western Hemisphere to American Scophony. American
Scophony, in turn, was to grant exclusive licenses for this terri-
tory to Paramount and General Precision. Scophony agreed
further not to market any products involving its inventions in
the Western Hemisphere, and Paramount and General Preci-
sion agreed not to export to the east.33 7 In a government civil
action the Court held that Scophony was transacting business
within the district for purposes of section 12, stating that
Scophony's operations in New York were a continuous course
of business before and throughout the period in question. The
Court emphasized that Scophony's failure to enter the United
States simply as manufacturer and seller of television equip-
ment led it to turn to complicated licensing and other patent
arrangements which were carried out not merely through cor-
porate forms and arrangements but by contracts binding the
participating companies to the common enterprise, as well as
the special medium of executing it, American Scophony. The
Court stated:
These were not mere licensing arrangements, nor did they
make Scophony nothing more than a shareholder for invest-
ment purposes . . . . The contracts created controls in
Scophony, and in the American interests as well, which
taken in conjunction with the stock controls called for con-
tinuing exercise of supervision over and intervention in
336. Scophony was entitled to elect three directors, president, vice presidents
and treasurer; the two American partners were entitled to elect two directors, secre-
tary, and assistant secretary.
337. The plan fell through because General Precision and Paramount did not
want to exploit the patents licensed through American Scophony and would not al-
low the agreements to be modified. The resignation of certain directors reduced the
number required for a quorum and American Scophony could not function.
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American Scophony's affairs.3 3 8
According to the Scophony Court the crucial issue of control is
to be determined by investigating "the actual unity and con-
tinuity of the whole course of conduct" and not by "atomizing
it into minute parts or events. ' 33 9
The Court in Scophony found that the foreign corporation
sufficiently controlled the subsidiary for section 12 purposes,
even though the formal identity of the two corporations was
maintained. In focussing on the question of actual control, the
Court specifically rejected the test for venue applied in Cannon
Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,340 a non-antitrust case.
Cannon held that the acts of an affiliate could not be attributed
to the defendant for venue purposes as long as the corpora-
tions retained a separate formal identity. Under Cannon, each
contact between the corporation must be evaluated in an atom-
izing approach; a formal separation is maintained if any such
contact is insufficient to show absolute control.3 4'
Despite Scophony, some courts have incorrectly denied
venue over a foreign affiliate by relying on Cannon.342 Such a
"pulverizing" approach 34 3 creates venue immunity for anti-
trust defendants which insulate themselves through wholly
owned and controlled but formally separate subsidiaries. 44
Most courts have appropriately rejected Cannon in favor of the
Scophony test of actual control.3 4 5  However, even taking the
Scophony approach, courts differ in determining when sufficient
control will be found. As with other aspects of section 12 anal-
ysis, the issue of control is fact-based, and depends on whether
the court engages in a broad or limited construction of section
12.
338. Scophony, 333 U.S. at 814.
339. Id. at 817.
340. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
341. Id. at 336-37.
342. O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974); Massey-
Ferguson, Ltd. v. Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co., Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 932
(D. Utah 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
343. See Scophony, 333 U.S. at 817.
344. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 842-43 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
345. See, e.g., Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., Inc., 499 F.
Supp. 829 (D. Or. 1980); Grappone Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123
(D.N.H. 1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp.
262 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
1986] INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION 471
The leading case representing a broad view of the Scophony
test is Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd.3" 6 Plaintiffs sought to establish section 12 venue over Jap-
anese electronics manufacturers based solely on the activities
of their United States marketing subsidiaries' transaction of
business in the district. The court found that the foreign par-
ents had "relationships of sufficient intimacy" with their sub-
sidiaries, in light of their established manufactur-
ing/trading/sales pattern, to be considered to be transacting
business through them.347 The Zenith court, evaluating prior
cases, listed the following factors as pertinent in determining
whether "sufficient intimacy" exists:
1. performance by the subsidiary or affiliate of business in
the district (for example, sales and servicings) that in a
less elaborate corporate scheme the absent corporation
would perform directly by its own branch offices or
agents;
2. partnership, in world-wide business competition, be-
tween the absent corporation and the corporation that
is present in the district;
3. capacity of the absent corporation to influence deci-
sions of the subsidiary or affiliate that might have anti-
trust consequences; controlling stock ownership and in-
terlocking directorates are indices of such a capacity;
4. the part that the subsidiary or affiliated corporation
plays in the over-all business activity of the absent cor-
poration;
5. existence of an integrated sales system involving manu-
facturing, trading and sales corporations;
6. status of the subsidiary or affiliate as a marketing arm of
the absent corporation;
34 8
7. use by the subsidiary or affiliate of a trademark owned
by the parent;
8. transfer of personnel back and forth between the absent
corporation and its subsidiary or affiliate or substantial
overlap in personnel; 49
9. presentation of a common marketing image by the re-
346. 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
347. Id. at 328.
348. See Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
349. See Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C.
1984). However, mere common directorship is not enough for a finding of control.
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lated corporations, especially when those corporations
hold themselves out to the public as a single entity that
is conveniently departmentalized either nationally or
worldwide; ° and
10. granting of an exclusive distributorship by the absent
corporation to its subsidiary or affiliate.
Financial control has also been deemed important by most
courts, including loan guarantees and a pervasive requirement
of financial approval. 5' In addition, undercapitalization of the
local affiliate will be relevant-some stricter courts say that this
is a critical requirement. 352
Representative of the stricter view of the Scophony test is
Williams v. Canon, Inc.353 where the court held that both man-
agement and day-to-day control of the local affiliate was re-
quired to satisfy section 12.3 5' The Williams court found that
the following facts failed to demonstrate both control and
management of Canon U.S.A. by Canon, Inc., the parent:
1) use of the parent's trademarks by the subsidiary, 2) visits in
the district by Canon's chairman and a director, who were both
directors of Canon U.S.A., to business meetings where there
was no suggestion that they represented the parent at the
meetings, 3) receipt by plaintiff of promotional materials di-
rectly from Canon upon the instructions of Canon U.S.A.,
4) service training in the district by Canon factory personnel,
Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,933 (D.D.C. 1981); Cascade Steel
Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 829 (D. Or. 1980).
350. This finding is often made as a result of defendant's officers description of
the subsidiary at a deposition. See, e.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp.
367, 374-76 (D. Md. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); MCI Communications
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,652, at 69,342-43
(D.D.C. 1983).
351. Cascade Steel, 499 F. Supp. at 838-40; Call Carl, 391 F. Supp. at 371; Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 88, 90 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Venue is
not proper, however, if financial approval is required only for major capital expendi-
tures, since major shareholders ordinarily must give such approval. King v. Johnson
Wax Assocs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711, 718 (D. Md. 1983).
352. See Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Acton Foodservices Corp., 554 F. Supp.
277, 279 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
353. 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
354. Id. at 380. "The parent controls the subsidiary when it dictates general
policies, but it manages the subsidiary when it controls the internal affairs of the sub-
sidiary and determines how the company will be operated on a day-to-day basis." Id.
(emphasis added). Contra Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co., Inc., 499
F. Supp. 829 (D. Or. 1980) (actual control required, but it need not be day-to-day
control; must be more than capacity to control).
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and 5) the making of "basic policy decisions" in Japan (such as
the pricing structure for Canon calculators and the opening of
branch offices).
It is submitted that the court which decided Zenith would
have decided that venue was proper under section 12 with the
facts presented in Willams. Basically a court following Williams
will take a more traditional alter ego approach to determine
section 12 venue, rather than a functional approach looking for
sufficient intimacy through actual control. 5 It is obvious that
the Zenith approach is preferable in terms of the reality of cor-
porate activity, in terms of the rationale of the venue require-
ment, which is to provide trial convenience, 56 and is in accord
with Scophony, which mandates a liberal reading of section 12 to
guarantee broad enforcement of the antitrust laws.
A defendant could logically be found to be transacting
business for venue purposes indirectly through an agent's ac-
tivity in the district. Attributing an agent's activity on behalf of
defendant presents a different analysis from whether a local af-
filiate's transacting business should be attributed to the non-
resident affiliate. An agency attribution should exist whenever
any local actor acts to the benefit of the non-resident whether
such an agent is an affiliate or a completely independent entity;
whereas, if defendant controls an affiliate, that affiliate's activ-
ity should count against defendant for all purposes, whether or
not the affiliate is specifically engaging in activity on defend-
ant's behalf.3 57
A few courts have seen the possibility of an agency theory
of section 12 venue, and have attributed the "agent's" activity
to defendant whenever the "agent" is conducting activity on
behalf of the defendant that the defendant would otherwise
355. For cases following the stricter view of Williams, see Kramer Motors, Inc. v.
British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980);
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Acton Foodservices, Corp., 554 F. Supp. 277, 279 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Sportmart, Inc. & Olympic Distribs., Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp. 1254
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Caribe, 475 F. Supp. at 717.
356. Trial will ordinarily be convenient in the district in which the defendant has
an intimate relationship with a local affiliate. A tighter nexus such as management
and day to day control is not required to prevent inconvenient litigation. Moreover,
the policy of the venue statutes to provide judicial economy is effectuated by a find-
ing of venue over both the local affiliate and the non-resident corporation.
357. A parallel distinction between corporate affiliate relationships and agency
relationships exists in the law of personal jurisdiction. See supra notes 129-37 and
accompanying text.
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have to conduct.358 Other courts, perhaps confused by the
control requirements of the Scophony rule as to automatic attri-
bution of the conduct of corporate affiliates, reject the idea that
the defendant transacts business in a district whenever it de-
rives benefit from the acts of one acting on its behalf.359 At
best, such courts find an "agency" relationship as to non-affili-
ates only when the defendant exercises such control over the
independent actor as to satisfy the Scophony test for corporate af-
filiates. 36 1 Imposition of control limitations on the agency the-
ory is unwarranted. It confuses the corporate affiliate with the
independent agent. It is contrary to the common sense, aver-
age businessperson's standard which the courts are required to
apply to section 12.361 More importantly, under such a view
defendants will not be subject to section 12 venue even though
they are purposefully, albeit indirectly, deriving substantial
benefit from the district. Again this view makes venue harder
to obtain than jurisdiction;361 2 such a result is inconceivable
under the broad view of section 12 mandated by Scophony.363
If venue is found under section 12 over an antitrust claim,
venue will also exist as to all other claims which are related to
the antitrust claim-even if they are not specifically covered by
section 12. One court has referred to "pendent venue" in
hearing related claims not specifically covered by section 12.364
The same policies of judicial economy and trial convenience
358. See, e.g., Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 442 F.
Supp. 1201, 1205 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (independent booking agency transacts busi-
ness on behalf of non-resident shipper; a court is not required "to ignore the activi-
ties of agents when venue is at issue under [section 12]. Indeed, such an interpreta-
tion would vitiate the very purpose of [section 12])."
359. See, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974);
Athlete's Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 35 (D. Del.
1977).
360. See, e.g., Amateur-Wholesale Elecs. v. R.L. Drake Co., 515 F. Supp. 580
(S.D. Fla. 1981) (independent local retailers not sufficiently controlled by defendants
to be deemed agents for purposes of section 12, even though such retailers sell sub-
stantial and consistent volume of defendant's products; court cites inapposite cases
on corporate affiliates).
361. Scophony, 333 U.S. at 808.
362. For a discussion of the agency theory ofjurisdiction, see supra notes 132-41
and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Dunham's, 614 F. Supp. at 624; Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Mari-
time Shipping Auth., 442 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (section 12 is to be con-
strued more broadly than parallel principles of personal jurisdiction).
364. Zenith, 402 F. Supp. at 328 n.38 (antidumping act claims not specifically
covered by section 12, but related to section 12 claims properly brought within the
1986] INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST JURISDICTION 475
exist here as are found under the doctrines of pendent subject
matter jurisdiction and pendent personal jurisdiction.365
The provisions of section 12, both in terms of allowing
venue and in terms of not allowing venue, can be overridden by
a fairly negotiated forum selection clause. 66 Forum selection
clauses will be enforced unless substantial injustice would re-
sult, or unless the clause is invalid because of fraud or over-
reaching.3 67
If the defendant is not an alien, and section 12 does not
apply, the proper districts for venue are extremely limited.368
If defendant is not a corporation, plaintiff can resort to section
4 of the Clayton Act, which provides for venue where defend-
ant is an "inhabitant" or is "found. ' 369 These terms are ex-
tremely limited and basically require plaintiff to sue the de-
fendant at its home.
Section 1391(b) of Title 28 appears to allow a forum
venue not necessarily allowed under the section 12 require-
ment of transacting business: an action may be brought in the
district where the claim arose.3
In fact, however, the Supreme Court has construed the
term "where the claim arose" in such a strict fashion that it is
inconceivable that a claim could "arise" in a district where de-
fendant was not also transacting business under section 12.
district). See also Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pendent
venue can be exercised over claim arising out of common factual transaction).
365. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text; I J. MOORE, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 0.142[3] (2d ed. 1984); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 10, at 32 (4th ed. 1983) ("If procedural convenience is enough to avoid the consti-
tutional limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal court, it should suffice also to
dispose with the purely statutory requirements as to venue.")
366. See Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1982) (dismissal even if section 12 satisifed); The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972) (case can be heard even though jurisdiction and venue would not
otherwise exist).
367. The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
368. If defendant is an alien, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1982) provides that venue is
proper in any judicial district. For an alien defendant there is no need to go to fur-
ther sources of venue beyond section 1391 (d) after failing under section 12, because
only section 12 provides a jurisdictional basis, to which some courts maintain that
section 12 venue is the key to the vault of statutory jurisdiction. See supra notes 288-
95 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 288-95.
370. See Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Centronics Data
Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
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For plaintiffs suing non-corporate defendants who are not sub-
ject to section 12, section 1391(b) will provide a forum choice
somewhat broader than that provided by section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.
37 1
The major teaching of Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,3 72
is that the claim does not arise in the district under section
1391(b) merely because the plaintiff is located there, or even
because the injury was suffered in such district. Rather, sec-
tion 1391 (b) was drafted with the convenience of the defendant,
the availability of witnesses, and the accessibility of evidence in
mind. In Leroy, that convenience was found where most of the
disputed acts occurred (Idaho), not where the effects of such
acts were felt by the plaintiff (Texas). The district where the
disputed acts of the defendant occurred is also of necessity a
district where the defendant transacted business under section
2.373 The court in Leroy expressly rejected the idea that in an
action where the injuries were pervasive, the defendaht should
be answerable under section 1391(b) throughout the United
States. 74 In sum, as to corporate defendants, section 1391(b)
provides no forum not already provided by section 12 of the
Clayton Act.
IV. FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND TRANSFER
OF VENUE
A. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine which
allows a court in its discretion to dismiss a suit even though the
forum chosen by plaintiff satisfies the requirements ofjurisdic-
tion and venue. The doctrine recognizes that satisfaction of
jurisdiction and venue requirements does not necessarily pre-
vent a suit in an extremely inconvenient forum in terms of
presentation of witnesses, proof, and the interest of the fo-
371. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 517.
372. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
373. See Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 517 ("[A]n antitrust claim will not arise
someplace unless the defendant is also transacting business within [section 12].").
374. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 157, 185 (1979). The
Court in Leroy basically followed the "weight of the contacts" approach to section
1391(b) which had been applied by many courts in antitrust cases. See generally
Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 510-16; Athlete's Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati
Co., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 35 (D. Del. 1977); Comment, supra note 331.
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rum.375 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the
plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to deference. However, if
the defendant can show that the chosen forum is extremely in-
convenient, and that another forum is much more convenient,
the court can in its discretion dismiss the case; forum non con-
veniens dismissals are conditioned upon the availability of
some alternative forum. 76
If the alternative forum presented by the defendant is
within the United States, forum non conveniens is not the ap-
propriate remedy. The harshness of dismissal under forum
non conveniens has been alleviated by the transfer of venue
provisions of Title 28. Forum non conveniens is thus pre-
cluded unless the alternative forum is another country.37 8
Even presuming that the only alternative forum is a for-
eign country, there is substantial current authority that the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine is not applicable to antitrust ac-
tions. The Fifth Circuit so held in Industrial Investment Develop-
ment Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 3 79 relying on the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 1.380 The ra-
tionale of both cases was that forum non conveniens would un-
reasonably hamper enforcement of the antitrust laws. 81 In re-
375. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
376. Id. (all witnesses and proof are located in another forum and forum state
has no interest in hearing the case, both public and private factors allow dismissal
within the court's discretion under the common law doctrine of forum non con-
veniens); C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307 (1 lth Cir. 1983)
(district court must compare convenience of plaintiff's forum with an alternative fo-
rum). Dismissal is often conditioned on defendant's waiving the defense of the stat-
ute of limitations in the other forum (if that is possible); a court will not dismiss on
forum non conveniens if plaintiff is left without any remedy. See, e.g., Constructora
Spilimerg, C.A. v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Co., 700 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1983) (conditional
dismissal; defendant must show that alternative forum can provide relief); In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, on January 1, 1978, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D.
Wash. 1982) (Bombay Plane Crash) (Indian law.does not allow waiver of statute of limi-
tations defense; dismissal therefore cannot be granted).
377. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
378. Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1983).
379. 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007
(1983).
380. United States v. Nat'l City Lines, Inc., I, 334 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1948).
381. Plaintiff in Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 890
n.18 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), as well as some
commentators, have argued that the Supreme Court reversed itself on the availability
of forum non conveniens in antitrust actions in United States v. National City Lines,
Inc., II, 337 U.S. 78 (1949). See Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Ap-
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sponse to these decisions, recent legislation has been pro-
posed which specifically states that forum non conveniens
would be available in an antitrust action. 82
It has been argued that forum non conveniens, if and
when available in an antitrust action, should be used to limit
the unreasonable extraterritorial application of the United
States antitrust laws. 83 This argument confuses the role of fo-
rum non conveniens and the role of choice of law. In effect the
argument puts the cart before the horse. A court making a fo-
rum non conveniens ruling does decide which country's law is
likely to be applied to the action. This is relevant to the forum
non conveniens motion since it is preferable in terms of judi-
cial convenience for the court which hears the case to apply its
own law.3 84 However, the decision of which law to apply must
already be made by the time the court decides whether to dis-
miss or not. 85 A court would only confuse its analysis if it
were to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds because ap-
plication of United States law would be unreasonable. The ap-
plicable law is, at any rate, only one factor among many factors
relevant to the forum non conveniens inquiry. 386
plication of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1712 n.128 (1985). This
argument is incorrect. The court in National City Lines II held only that the venue
transfer provisions ofTitle 28 were available in antitrust actions. A transfer within
the federal system will not at all hamper enforcement of the antitrust laws. Thus,
National City Lines II has no effect on National City Lines I as to the unavailability of
forum non conveniens in antitrust actions. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (assuming without
deciding that forum non conveniens is inapplicable in antitrust actions); Laker Air-
ways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
382. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S 1160 (1985) (a bill to amend
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to modify the application of such acts to inter-
national commerce).
383. See Note, supra note 381; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984); Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
384. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Signalas v. Lido Mari-
time, Inc., 776 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1985).
385. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); In re McLelland Engi-
neers, Inc., 742 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir. 1984). "The first step in any forum non
conveniens analysis is a determination of which substantive law governs the case."
Id.; American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408
(5th Cir. 1983).
386. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947); Lehman v. Humphrey Cayman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339, 345 (8th
Cir. 1983). "The fact that a federal court may be required to apply foreign law is not
dispositive on the forum non conveniens issue." Id.
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Finally, even if forum non conveniens is applicable to anti-
trust actions, a court must be particularly concerned whether
an antitrust plaintiff could obtain any relief in a foreign forum.
The Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno3 87 held that
forum non conveniens dismissal would not be precluded
merely because the more convenient forum would apply a sub-
stantive law less favorable to plaintiff. The Court did not, how-
ever, change the standard forum non conveniens doctrine that
an alternative forum must exist as a practical matter.3 88 Thus,
if plaintiff would not receive any relief under foreign law in a
foreign forum, then even Piper would prevent dismissal. 38 9
The lack of any relief will occur whenever the foreign forum
does not recognize United States concepts of antitrust in-
jury.390
B. Venue Transfer
Congress has passed three statutes which provide for
venue transfer within the federal court system. All the statutes
seek to provide transfer to a convenient forum. Section 1404
of title 28, the most important of these provisions, allows
transfer to another district where the case might have been
brought, if such transfer is for the convenience of the parties
and in the interests of justice. 9' Section 1404 applies when
venue and personal jurisdiction are both proper in the trans-
feror court.392 Section 1406 of that title is to the same effect,
except that it applies when venue and personal jurisdiction are
improper in the transferor court.393 Section 1631 is a recent
387. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
388. Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aerlingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984); Bom-
bay Plane Crash, 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
389. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
390. See Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 891 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). This is another reason why
forum non conveniens cannot be used to control extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law: forum non conveniens is by definition inapplicable if the
foreign law would provide no relief to plaintiff.
Note, however, that if the forum law provides some relief with no substantial
obstacles to obtaining it, dismissal could be granted even if the relief is much less
than a United States court would provide. Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224 (1st
Cir. 1984) ("blood money" settlement under Saudi Arabian law provides some re-
covery).
391. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
392. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
393. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
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provision to the same effect, except that it applies when venue
is proper in the transferor forum and jurisdiction is not.394
Under the solution proposed herein as to alien defendants-
venue available in any district, worldwide statutory jurisdiction
under section 12 of the Clayton Act, limited constitutionally by
the national contacts test-most transfer cases would arise
under section 1404. Less expansive interpretations ofjurisdic-
tion and venue may require resort to the other transfer sec-
tions. If a court does combine section 12 jurisdiction with alien
venue, the venue transfer provisions take on enormous impor-
tance to the alien defendant: transfer of venue is the defend-
ant's only protection from substantially inconvenient litiga-
tion.395
All three statutes limit the judicial district to which trans-
fer can be made. The transferee forum must be one in which
both jurisdiction and venue would have existed at the time the
action was brought.396 The defendant cannot, at the time of
transfer, waive any objection to venue or jurisdiction that it
could have waived if the case had originally been brought in the
transferee court.3 97 Thus before transfer the transferor court
must engage in a hypothetical analysis of whether jurisdiction
and venue existed in the transferee court on the day when the
suit was actually brought elsewhere.
Under section 1404, the transferor court must determine
that the transfer to the alternate forum comports with the con-
venience of the parties and the interests ofjustice. While these
considerations parallel the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
it is clear that section 1404 did not merely codify forum non
394. McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1983). But see
Nose v. Rementer, 610 F. Supp. 191, 192 (D. Del. 1985) (section 1631 refers only to
subject matter jurisdiction; where personal jurisdiction in transferor court is lacking,
transfer can be made under section 1404).
395. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
396. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 5.06
n. 154.
397. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 349 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
398. See, e.g., Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co., 745 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1984). The
Hoffman requirement is automatically satisfied if alien venue is combined with section
12 statutory jurisdiction and national contacts. By definition, such a case "might
have been brought" in any judicial district. The Hoffman analysis is more difficult if
the court resorts to "transacting business" for venue or the state long-arm statutes
for jurisdiction.
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conveniens3 9 ' Generally speaking, venue transfer will be eas-
ier to obtain than a similar motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens. The "gap" of convenience between plaintiff's
choice of forum and the alternative forum need not be as great
as in a forum non conveniens situation.4"' As with forum non
conveniens, the court compares the relative ease of trying the
case in the two districts in terms of production of witnesses
and proof, as well as the relative interests of the two courts in
trying the case. 40 ' A decision to transfer on convenience or
justice grounds is within the discretion of the district court.40 2
As with forum non conveniens, plaintiff's choice of forum
is entitled to respect on a motion to transfer venue under sec-
tion 1404.403 Courts in antitrust cases have held that plaintiff's
choice of forum is entitled to "particular respect. 40 4 Thus de-
fendant may have to prove a greater convenience gap in an
antitrust case than in any other case. This greater burden is
unwarranted in cases where alien venue is combined with sec-
tion 12 jurisdiction and national contacts. In such a case, de-
fendant's only protection from substantial inconvenience are
the provisions on transfer of venue. Moreover, if plaintiff is
not suing in its home district, the venue privilege is especially
unworthy of "particular respect;" otherwise forum-shopping
would be encouraged.40 5
399. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
400. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); King v. Johnson Wax Assocs.
Inc., 565 F. Supp. 711 (D. Md. 1983).
401. R. CASAD, supra note 26, at 5.06.
402. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L., 726 F.2d 1381, 1399
(9th Cir. 1984) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant transfer in
the interests of justice); In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (trial court
abused discretion in transferring for its own convenience); King v. Johnson Wax As-
socs., 565 F. Supp. 711, 719 (D. Md. 1983). Ordinarily, a ruling under section 1404
is not immediately appealable, unless the court misconstrues whether a claim might
have been brought in the transferee forum. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1964). In extraordinary circumstances, mandamus may be available. In re Scott, 709
F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (mandamus allowed where no tolerable basis for transfer
existed). In the ordinary case, a claim of error under section 1404 is relatively use-
less, because it is made after the litigation has been completed.
403. Scott, 709 F.2d at 720; Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
404. See Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 442 F. Supp.
1202, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (1950).
405. King v. Johnson Wax Assocs., 565 F. Supp. 711, 721 (D. Md. 1983); Piper,
454 U.S. at 255-56. Two good and conflicting examples of convenience balancing in
antitrust cases are Star Lines, Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 442 F.
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In contrast to section 1404, transfer under sections 1406
and 1631 does not require comparison of the relative conven-
ience of transferor and transferee districts. This is because the
case by definition cannot be heard in the transferor forum.
The only question, presuming that a forum with proper venue
and jurisdiction exists, is whether the court should transfer or
dismiss the case.4 ° 6 Generally speaking, transfer will be
granted unless plaintiff was in bad faith in bringing the case in
the transferor court.4 °7 Transfer is especially mandated if the
statute of limitations will have run if the case is dismissed.40 8
CONCLUSION
Finding an appropriate United States forum for an inter-
national antitrust case is unnecessarily complicated. Congress,
with its intent to effectuate broad enforcement of the antitrust
laws, has provided statutory authority which allows suit in any
judicial district so long as the antitrust defendant has minimum
contacts with the United States. Thus far the courts have gen-
erally ignored the solution provided by Congress in favor of
the long-arm statutes of the state legislature. This state of af-
fairs must be corrected in order to prohibit a jurisdictional
windfall to alien defendants that was not intended by Con-
gress.
Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (transfer denied) and King v.Johnson Wax Assocs., 565
F. Supp. 711 (D. Md. 1983) (transfer granted).
406. Motions for transfer in these situations are, of course, ordinarily made by
plaintiffs. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
407. See Manley v. Engram, 735 F.2d 1463 (11 th Cir. 1985); R. CASAD, supra note
26, at 5.06[3].
408. Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
